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1 
ARTICLE 
SOLVING ETHICAL PUZZLES TO UNLOCK UNIVERSITY 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER CLIENT WORK FOR AN 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LEGAL CLINIC 
CYNTHIA L. DAHL1 
ABSTRACT 
Intellectual property (IP) and technology legal clinics are experiencing an 
unprecedented surge in popularity.  Before 2000, there were only five such clin-
ics, but by 2016, there were seventy-four, with fifty added since 2010 alone.2  As 
law schools are approving new IP clinics and as practitioners are developing 
syllabi, there is an increasing need to share knowledge about models that work 
and how to avoid pitfalls. 
One potentially fertile—but traditionally underutilized—source of client work 
for an IP and technology clinic is the university technology transfer office 
(TTO), the department that protects, markets, and licenses all university intel-
lectual property (IP).  Through TTO projects, students access cutting-edge tech-
nologies, grapple with sophisticated legal concepts, and conform their legal 
counsel to business realities.  Yet very few IP clinics accept TTO projects at all, 
let alone focus on them as a sizeable percentage of their docket. 
This disconnect might be explained by the unexpected and thorny ethical chal-
lenges that this work can present.  For example, with disclosure, an especially 
acute concern with high-stakes patents, are students who are not members of a 
state Bar sufficiently bound to a duty of confidentiality?  What happens to attor-
ney-client privilege when students from the business school and students from 
the law school work together on a project?  When the project involves advising 
 
1  Cynthia L. Dahl is Practice Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Detkin In-
tellectual Property and Technology Legal Clinic at the University of Pennsylvania Law 
School.  The author wishes to thank Jennifer Fan, Ron Lazebnik, Brett Stohs, Kate Kruse, Ian 
Weinstein, Marcy Karin, and Danielle Cover for their thoughtful comments and suggestions, 
and Mariah Ford for her support and excellent research assistance.   
2  Survey by Cynthia L. Dahl and Victoria Phillips for upcoming paper, tentatively entitled 
“Setting Another Place at the Table: A Survey to Compare Intellectual Property and Technol-
ogy Clinics and Examine Their Growing Role Within the Clinical Community.”  
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a new spin-out venture built around a university-owned technology, how can the 
students share the advice with both the TTO and the venture without compro-
mising privilege, breaching confidentiality, and running the risk of developing 
a conflict of interest?  And finally, if the project exposes students to prior art 
when there is an active patent application, are they ethically bound to report the 
information, even if it may defeat the client’s patent? 
Drawing on the specific experiences of a clinic that has been doing tech trans-
fer work for four years, this article first suggests a model for engagement and 
then identifies and analyzes some of the most important ethical challenges this 
work presents.  Analyzing the Model Rules, the USPTO Guidelines, and the lat-
est case law in the areas, it suggests solutions for clinics interested in working 
with the TTO to unlock great potential for student professional development, 
university innovation, and scientific and technological entrepreneurship in the 
community. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A medical school researcher at a major research university has discovered an 
ingenious blood anti-coagulant.  Its delivery system could make treatment more 
effective for millions of people. However, the market is crowded with hundreds 
of patents, and recent developments in the law make successfully patenting such 
innovations less than certain.  The issue?  He needs to decide which of his patent 
applications is strongest and most critical to launching a product, because his 
start-up company has limited cash and must pay a licensing fee to the university 
for each necessary patent.  He also must know if there are other patents that may 
block his success, so that he can prepare to innovate, license, or partner.  In short, 
he needs a licensing strategy informed by IP research. 
Elsewhere on campus, an engineering professor has developed a robot that 
can unfurl in tight spaces through a proprietary mechanism.  It is strong yet ma-
neuverable.  The issue?  She must identify the potential markets that hold the 
most promise, given possible customers, competitors, and other patents for re-
lated technologies.  And then she must evaluate if her patent, as drafted, will 
sufficiently protect her product against would-be competitors, or if she should 
attempt to broaden its coverage.  In short, she needs a protection and commer-
cialization strategy informed by IP research. 
Such in-depth IP research can be cost-prohibitive for even well-heeled uni-
versity technology transfer operations, simply due to the sheer number of prom-
ising technologies demanding attention at any one time.  Yet this research can 
make the difference between whether a spin-off company succeeds or fails. 
Law students can help. 
For the past four years, the Detkin IP and Technology Legal Clinic (the Detkin 
IP Clinic or the Clinic) has seized an opportunity to work with the world-class 
technology transfer office at the University of Pennsylvania (Penn), known as 
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Penn’s Center for Innovation (PCI).3  Detkin IP Clinic students support PCI and 
Penn’s research by stepping in at critical junctures when legal research and anal-
ysis can help a research team or fledgling spin-off take the next step toward 
commercialization with more confidence.  This opportunity has enriched the stu-
dents’ law school experience, in addition to benefiting the university and its re-
searchers. 
But running a clinic that has a TTO as a major client presents markedly dif-
ferent challenges than running a more traditional transactional clinic servicing 
individual inventors or smaller start-ups. There are of course substantive chal-
lenges to having students work with very complicated inventions and technolo-
gies. There are pedagogical and logistical challenges inherent in working with 
an institutional client. And perhaps most strikingly, there can be professional 
ethics challenges to navigate, particularly involving upholding the duty of con-
fidentiality and maintaining the attorney-client privilege.  This article aspires to 
provide guidance to other clinics so they may successfully avail themselves of 
this rich source of work that benefits both students and their institutions. 
Part II describes the working relationship between the Detkin IP Clinic and 
PCI to provide one example of how a clinic and a tech transfer office can work 
together.  Part III discusses and suggests solutions for the substantive, logistical, 
and pedagogical challenges that such a working arrangement might present.  
And Part IV describes and discusses solutions to four of the ethical challenges 
we have faced in detail, including: i) binding students to a duty of confidentiality 
outside of student practice rules; ii) maintaining confidentiality and privilege 
when bringing non-lawyer consultants in to consult on a case; iii) maintaining 
confidentiality, privilege, and avoiding conflicts of interest when projects in-
volve two companies; and iv) navigating disclosure obligations when research-
ing technology covered by a pending patent application. 
II. AN EXAMPLE OF A CLINIC/TECH TRANSFER ARRANGEMENT: THE DETKIN IP 
CLINIC AND PCI 
Although there are several ways to structure a clinic/TTO relationship,4 the 
 
3  DETKIN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & TECHNOLOGY LEGAL CLINIC, https://www.law.up-
enn.edu/clinic/intellectualproperty/ [https://perma.cc/828P-JFN9] (last visited Nov. 6, 2016). 
4  A handful of other schools have clinics that also currently do some work with their 
university technology transfer offices, including: the University of Notre Dame Law School; 
the University of Virginia School of Law; the University of Washington School of Law; and 
the University of Michigan Law School. Edging Out a Patent with Notre Dame Law Students, 
UNIV.OF NOTRE DAME THE LAW SCH., http://law.nd.edu/news/61898-edging-out-a-patent-
with-notre-dame-law-students [https://perma.cc/PEV4-QX4Z] (last visited Nov. 12, 2016); 
Patent and Licensing Clinics, UNIV. OF VIRGINIA SCH. OF LAW, https://www.law.vir-
ginia.edu/html/academics/ip/ipclinic.htm [https://perma.cc/J7ZS-D838] (last visited Nov. 12, 
2016); Entrepreneurial Law Clinic, UNIV. OF WASHINGTON SCH. OF LAW, 
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Detkin Clinic/PCI relationship is one example.  This Part II starts by introducing 
the parties and detailing the genesis of our working relationship, and then de-
scribes the kinds of work projects that we have handled throughout the last four 
years. 
A.  The Detkin Clinic 
The Detkin IP Clinic5 is a one-semester law school class taught by full-time 
faculty structured as a “teaching law firm.”  It is offered in the spring and the 
fall semester, with eight to ten students per term.  A twice-weekly seminar in-
troduces concepts and skills through simulation and reflection, all to prepare the 
students to learn through their work for at least two live clients. 
In past terms the Clinic has been open to all students, but starting in the fall 
semester 2015, we instituted admission through application only. The shift was 
designed to ensure there were enough students with prior scientific or technical 
backgrounds to accommodate complicated PCI work.  As Clinic Director, I 
choose students with relevant coursework and backgrounds, and ensure that all 
students have a grounding in patent concepts, as well as experience working 
alongside technical partners, by conducting a patent claims drafting simulation 
within the seminar. In the seminar, the Detkin IP Clinic students partner with 
students from Penn’s School of Engineering and Applied Science (SEAS).6  Be-
sides PCI client work, the Detkin IP Clinic students also handle individual cli-
ents including entrepreneurs, inventors, artists, and nonprofits.7 
B. Penn’s Center for Innovation:  
Technology transfer offices in a university are charged with translating early 
 
http://www.law.washington.edu/Clinics/Entrepreneurial/about.aspx [https://perma.cc/4XTK-
7FTT] (last visited Nov. 12, 2016); FAQs About the Clinic, MICHIGAN LAW  
ENTREPRENEURSHIP CLINIC UNIV. OF MICHIGAN, http://www.law.umich.edu/clinical/entrepre-
neurshipclinic/about/Pages/FAQs-About-the-Clinic.aspx [https://perma.cc/6945-4EGG] (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2016). Still other clinics have worked with their technology transfer offices 
in the past.  These include: The University of Detroit Mercy School of Law, the Arizona State 
University Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, the George Mason University School of 
Law, and the University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law.  Although I have tried to in-
clude all relevant clinics in this list, I regret if I have omitted any. 
5  The Detkin Clinic was funded by a generous gift from Peter Detkin, EE’82, L’85, 
founder of Intellectual Ventures. See DETKIN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & TECHNOLOGY 
LEGAL CLINIC, https://www.law.upenn.edu/clinic/intellectualproperty/ 
[https://perma.cc/828P-JFN9] (last visited Oct. 3, 2016).   
6  For a detailed explanation of this module, see generally Cynthia L. Dahl, Teaching 
Would-Be IP Lawyers to ‘Speak Engineer’: An Interdisciplinary Module to Teach New Intel-
lectual Property Attorneys to Work Across Disciplines, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 361 
(2015).   
7   DETKIN, supra note 3.  
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stage discoveries and ideas generated in the university lab or classroom into 
products that could benefit consumers in the market.8  PCI facilitates technology 
development connections between Penn and the private sector by managing the 
IP protection and licensing of all Penn-owned technology (which includes all 
inventions and technology developed with Penn resources or facilities), incubat-
ing technologies and technology ventures, managing sponsored research agree-
ments and materials transfer agreements, and seeking strategic technology and 
commercialization partnerships for the university.9 
As part of the commercialization effort, PCI Ventures, a division of PCI, runs 
the UPstart program to help interested Penn faculty and staff commercialize their 
Penn-owned ideas through the creation of a business.10  UPstart launches and 
organizes the new business, providing all logistical support and a framework 
that allows the founders to remain at Penn and avoid risky capital expenditures.11 
UPstart provides management team recruitment services, introductions to inves-
tors, market research, preferred partner relationships, a legal document library, 
commercialization grant preparation, and help with IP strategy.12  The busi-
nesses are structured as partnerships between the founding faculty or staff and 
Penn.  PCI and PCI Ventures also run a National Science Foundation-funded I-
Corps business accelerator for Penn teams with very early stage ideas.13 
The funder of the Detkin IP Clinic saw an opportunity in having law clinic 
students work with PCI, both as a vehicle to vividly demonstrate to students the 
interplay between law and business in the commercialization of innovation, and 
as a chance to provide services that PCI could not otherwise afford to deliver to 
its inventors, either because of manpower or funding limitations.  There is tre-
mendous value in exposing law students to the work of a powerful institutional 
technology transfer office.  Students work with cutting-edge technologies in-
vented by world-renowned academics.  Students also are privy to the decisions 
involved in managing and maximizing the value of an enormous international 
patent portfolio.  Since the technology is so early stage, they can witness the so-
 
8  See URVentures, What is Technology Transfer?, http://www.rochester.edu/ven-
tures/about/what-is-technology-transfer/ [https://perma.cc/TNK6-XTJ3] (last visited Nov. 
14, 2016).  
9  For more information about PCI, see generally About Us, PENN CENTER FOR 
INNOVATION, http://www.pci.upenn.edu/about/ [https://perma.cc/BJ8Q-AS9R]. (last visited 
Oct. 9, 2016). 
10 UPstart, PENN CENTER FOR INNOVATION, http://pci.upenn.edu/upstart/ 
[http://perma.cc/VE24-J49K] (last visited Oct. 5, 2016).  
11  Id. 
12 Services, PENN CENTER FOR INNOVATION http://pci.upenn.edu/services/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZZ9V-KB84] (last visited Nov. 6, 2016). 
13  See Penn I-Corps Site, PENN CENTER FOR INNOVATION http://pci.upenn.edu/icorps/ 
[https://perma.cc/XGG6-DNPR] (last visited Nov. 6, 2016). 
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called “Valley of Death”—the vast gulf of time, money and effort that inventors 
of early stage ideas must cross before they can achieve successful commerciali-
zation14—playing out before them.  They learn that a good idea does not auto-
matically seed a strong company, and they learn how IP protection is a means to 
a business end, instead of an end in itself.  These are lessons that students might 
not otherwise be able to learn until they have practiced for several years, and 
only if they are lucky enough to have the right clients and opportunities.  Of 
course, PCI gains the benefit of research that would otherwise be too cost pro-
hibitive to perform, which often gives critical information or welcome confir-
mation as to protection strategies and licensing or commercialization options. 
C. The Client Work 
Over the past four years, Detkin IP Clinic students have handled projects out 
of several different departments of PCI, each providing a unique opportunity to 
work with different stages of the IP protection and commercialization process: 
i) Intellectual Property; ii) Legal; iii) Ventures; and iv) Licensing (several de-
partments with jurisdiction over different schools within Penn).  For a variety of 
reasons explained further below, the work out of the Ventures and Licensing 
departments has provided the most satisfying experience for both parties.  How-
ever, I include a discussion of the work we have done for all departments both 
because our lessons learned might be valuable and because the experience might 
differ at other schools that have other parameters or circumstances. 
1) Intellectual Property (Patent Prosecution) 
The PCI Intellectual Property department makes decisions about how best to 
protect Penn’s early stage technologies.  It works with faculty to elicit invention 
disclosures, then “triages” the new ideas, deciding if Penn should take formal 
steps to protect the inventions by filing either a provisional or nonprovisional 
patent,15 or potentially protecting the inventions through different means. 
Students initially drafted office action responses for pending nonprovisional 
 
14  See, e.g., Philip E. Auerswald & Lewis M. Branscomb, Valleys of Death and Darwinian 
Seas: Financing the Invention to Innovation Transition in the United States, 28 J. TECH. 
TRANSFER 227, 229 (2003); T. Randolph Beard et al., A Valley of Death in the Innovation 
Sequence: An Economic Investigation, 18 RES. EVALUATION 343 (2009); Charles W. Wessner, 
Driving Innovations Across the Valley of Death, 48 RES. TECH. MGMT. 9 (2005).  
15  Filing a provisional patent can reserve a filing date for a relatively low cost for up to a 
year.  If the inventor converts the provisional to a nonprovisional patent within one year, he 
keeps the original provisional filing date for all material originally disclosed. Provisional Ap-
plication for Patent, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/patent-basics/types-patent-applications/provi-
sional-application-patent [https://perma.cc/YA85-VQAG] (last visited Nov. 6, 2016). 
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patent applications.16 Although students learned about the patentability standard 
and had to craft very technical arguments, it was awkward to join the project 
midstream, particularly when the prosecution was already being handled by an 
outside law firm.17  This type of project can be fruitful, but it requires that stu-
dents have sufficient background in the science behind the patent to not waste 
time learning substance.18  In addition, the outside counsel must be willing to 
share access to the inventor and provide appropriate supervision and feedback 
for the work, and the deadline for the office action response must be timed to-
ward the end of the semester.  Given the delicate parameters necessary for these 
projects, the Detkin IP Clinic has not continued to pursue such work.  However, 
responding to office actions could be a good learning experience for clinic stu-
dents not operating under the same limitations, for example if the technology 
transfer office handles its own prosecution in house, or if the clinic is a year-
long course. 
We have also considered having students file provisional or nonprovisional 
patent applications for Penn inventions outright, since several Detkin IP Clinic 
students have been registered patent agents.  However, because of PCI’s struc-
ture of outsourcing, this work is already being done competently by outside 
firms.  In addition, PCI fears that a decision to hire the Clinic rather than an 
outside firm might (wrongly) indicate to the university inventor that PCI has 
only a second-tier interest in the invention.19  As a result, there are management 
and perception issues to work out before this can be viable work for the Clinic 
students.  However, students have had great success drafting patents over stu-
dent, as opposed to faculty, inventions.20  Although this is technically not work 
 
16  Office actions are arguments from the USPTO as to why a patent cannot issue, to which 
the applicant must file a formal response. Responding to Office Actions, UNITED STATES 
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks-maintaining-trade-
mark-registration/responding-office-actions [https://perma.cc/L8T4-5ZE7] (last visited Nov. 
6, 2016).   
17  PCI outsources all of its prosecution work.   
18  One student we assigned had her PhD in neuroscience and the other had his Masters in 
biochemistry. 
19  On the contrary, Clinic patents get much more attention than the typical outsourced 
patent.  Since the work is done for free, Clinic students are able to spend many more hours on 
the application, turning out a potentially more complete finished product than would be fea-
sible for an attorney billing by the hour.  
20  Under the Penn Patent Policy, Penn does not own the inventions of the vast majority of 
undergraduate or graduate students, including those in the School of Design, the School of 
Engineering and Applied Sciences, and the Wharton School of Business.  Nonetheless, the 
Clinic is careful to have inventors seek a waiver of ownership from PCI before we take on 
this work.  Although it would not present a conflict of interest to draft the patent even if Penn 
were to own the student invention, we need to make sure that we know the identity of our 
client.  For background, see Patent and Tangible Research Property Policies and Procedures 
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for PCI, it does promote innovation at Penn.  Such inventions have included a 
flushable pregnancy test and a public bike lock.21 
Finally, PCI’s Intellectual Property department has asked the Clinic to help 
evaluate the strength of PCI patents at critical stages in their prosecution, such 
as when PCI must decide whether to convert a provisional patent into a nonpro-
visional patent, or when PCI decides whether and where to file the patent over-
seas.  Since PCI has limited resources, it needs data to ensure it is pursuing only 
its strongest and most promising patents.  While such analysis might be valuable 
to PCI, we must ensure that the project is also pedagogically helpful for the stu-
dents.22  If the analysis is over disparate patents without context, and does not 
provide an opportunity to interact with the inventors, it may not be as valuable 
as other projects we do for PCI.  The students thrive when they have opportuni-
ties to define the problem themselves and craft and implement solutions, which 
may not happen when the project is proscribed and discrete.  If we are able to 
ensure that the pedagogical goals for students are met, then this sort of work 
might be suitable for future semesters. 
2) Legal 
PCI has several resident lawyers that perform and oversee the contracting be-
hind all Penn technology licensing negotiations and deals.23  We have in past 
semesters accepted this department as a clinic client, marking up simple agree-
ments—such as nondisclosure agreements and material transfer agreements—
and doing legal research.  This work introduces students to the workings of a 
sophisticated in-house legal operation and provides valuable inside lessons 
about the risk tolerance level, philosophy, and contract terms of a university cli-
ent. However, many of the subject agreements must be turned around more 
quickly than our clinical supervisory structure will allow. In addition, there is a 
learning curve to understanding PCI’s deal terms that is difficult to impart over 
a few short assignments.  In order to reap the benefits of the exposure while still 
 
of the University of Pennsylvania, 2015 U. PA. ALMANAC SUPP. 1 (effective July 1, 2015), 
available at http://pci.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/patent-policy-7-1-15.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/44YW-H8FW]. 
21  These patents might not otherwise have gotten filed, or filed quickly, and the clients 
were extremely grateful for the services.  One of the clients opined, “[t]hank you again for all 
your help . . .  with transitioning our self-drafted provisional into an actual patent. We’re cur-
rently in the process of having two more provisionals drafted. We have some term sheets in 
hand and finger[s]-crossed we’ll be on our way to an actual company with protectable IP. We 
couldn’t have done it without you and the IP Clinic!!”   
22  See infra Part III for a full discussion of the pedagogical challenges of doing work with 
the tech transfer office. 
23  See Who We Are, PENN CENTER FOR INNOVATION http://pci.upenn.edu/who-we-are/ 
[https://perma.cc/H8QU-KVJC] (last visited Nov. 14, 2016).  
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providing needed services to PCI, this work is better-suited to an externship pro-
gram.  When the student is resident for a semester in the PCI legal contracting 
office, overseen by employees of PCI, many of the impediments that prevent 
this situation from being optimal disappear. 
3) Ventures 
Penn faculty and staff who have opted to participate in PCI’s separate UPstart 
program within the Ventures department have already decided to form a com-
pany to commercialize their innovation, and have formally contracted for PCI’s 
help in exchange for equity ownership.  Although often they have not yet li-
censed the technology from Penn, there is usually a patent pending.  When they 
come to the Detkin IP Clinic, the companies are often at an IP crossroads and 
want to make these “bet the company” decisions thoughtfully, supported by re-
search that they and PCI often cannot afford to do. 
This has provided some of the most interesting and suitable PCI work for 
Clinic students, who have in turn provided the ventures with invaluable advice.  
Examples of student projects include the following: 
Evaluate patent strength.  We can compare the UPstart company’s filed pa-
tents to other applications and patents in the field to evaluate the strength of the 
UPstart company’s coverage.  We can then suggest other elements to add to a 
pending patent based on “white spaces” in the market and address more recent 
development of the product.  The analysis is useful both to refine patenting strat-
egy and to prove IP value to potential investors. 
Rank order patent portfolios.  Sometimes a researcher spins off many ideas 
for related technologies, resulting in many patents.  The UPstart company (and 
PCI) may be unsure which technology might be the most commercially viable.  
Students can search different fields to determine which path to commercializa-
tion is clearest from a patent perspective.  They can also use the resources of 
Wharton’s Lippincott Library to analyze product markets.  This information can 
help PCI prioritize patenting strategy and help the UPstart company determine 
exactly which patents it must license back from PCI in order to compete in the 
marketplace. 
Perform “landscape analyses.”  Students can identify competitor patents and 
offer advice about any infringement concerns so that the UPstart company can 
refine its product development or develop a third-party licensing strategy. 
Inform protection strategies.  When there is not yet a patent on file for the 
UPstart technology, students can provide research and support to guide a pro-
tection strategy.  This is especially helpful when it is not clear if and how the 
UPstart technology might be patented, as when it is a software product, a busi-
ness method, or otherwise treads close to one of the exceptions to patentable 
subject matter.  Even if it is patentable technology, the field may be so crowded 
that a patent would be too narrow to be valuable.  The students can recommend 
a path to the broadest possible patent, or might recommend that the technology 
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be protected in a different way, for example through copyright or trade secret. 
These are extremely satisfying client projects, both for student learning and 
for value to PCI.  They are the best projects to meet the substantive, logistical 
and pedagogical challenges of doing work for tech transfer, although as dis-
cussed more in Part IV below, they also present the most interesting ethical is-
sues.  Substantively and logistically, the UPstart projects are good because they 
are urgent and easier to conceptualize for the students than some other technol-
ogy transfer projects.  UPstart companies concern relatively late stage university 
technology where the inventors are already implementing a preliminary plan for 
the technology’s use.  In addition, there is sometimes a prototype, which makes 
the business easier to understand.  These projects are also good for PCI because 
the companies value, but could likely not otherwise afford, the legal research the 
students provide.  The students’ unbiased and outside perspective provides con-
firmation and weight to what previously might have only been a hunch as to how 
to proceed.  Pedagogically, the projects are good because the students have to 
give legal counsel in context, in that there is an actual company at stake.  Yet 
ethically, these projects can be complex because they involve two potential cli-
ents and technology that is often still subject to a pending patent application, and 
present a great opportunity to work with outside nonlegal consultants. 
4) Licensing 
Most recently, the Clinic accepted client work from PCI’s Licensing depart-
ment.  This department markets the early stage Penn technologies to companies 
and other organizations interested in commercialization.  As with the UPstart 
work, the technologies handled in Licensing tend towards the more developed 
end of the spectrum; they are usually already patented, and PCI has a potential 
licensor in mind.  The student work revolves around helping PCI remove im-
pediments gating a technology’s potentially valuable licensing potential. 
For example, in one project, a student analyzed technology that had been co-
developed by inventors at several institutions.  A potential licensor did not know 
which institution to approach as the owner.  The challenge was to unravel who 
had invented which part of the technology to set the stage for a cooperative pros-
ecution and commercialization agreement between the institutions.  Had the stu-
dent not done the analysis, no one could have filed a patent and the institutions 
would have been stymied in their efforts to work together to exploit the technol-
ogy.  This project ended up being quite valuable to PCI, which is now able to 
commercialize a valuable technology that had been in stasis. 
In another project, students researched the portfolio of several potential licen-
sors for a technology and recommended a strategy to best approach the parties 
with the Penn portfolio.  The students had to evaluate the value of the Penn pa-
tent applications within the field, and recommend whether and how to enhance 
the patent coverage to become a more attractive licensing prospect given the 
needs of the potential licensors. 
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Similar to the UPstart work, these projects can be pedagogically valuable, as 
they offer exposure to the actual inventors and require the students to think 
through business as well as legal questions.  This client work can provide a great 
opportunity to connect raw legal analysis to an ultimate business goal.  Yet, these 
projects bring up the same ethical challenges as do the Ventures projects.  The 
remaining two parts of this article address these challenges and suggest solu-
tions. 
III. SUBSTANTIVE, PEDAGOGICAL AND LOGISTICAL CHALLENGES TO WORKING 
WITH A TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER OFFICE, AND RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS 
Although technology transfer work can be a win-win for clinical students and 
universities, setting up and running a program is not without its challenges.  This 
Part III identifies and discusses some of the substantive, pedagogical, and logis-
tical challenges inherent in establishing a clinic–tech transfer relationship.  The 
challenges are borne out of the necessity of working with very technical subject 
matter, and intertwining two entities with very different missions, timetables and 
needs. 
Substantively, the subject matter of university technology transfer work can 
be quite technical.  Many of the students do not have enough background to 
immediately understand the subject matter, and some are even intimidated by it.  
Many students, even in an IP clinic, have never done any work with patents, and 
a sizeable number have never even read a patent before.  In addition, the UPstart 
projects are complicated and force the students to consider both legal and busi-
ness issues.  Many of the students have no business coursework or background.  
There are significant substantive challenges to doing this work. 
To ameliorate these issues, I almost always team the students on PCI projects.  
The students tackle complicated issues with more confidence when they are 
paired.  When, as in some semesters, I have fewer scientifically- or technically-
trained students in the class, I pair the students that do have some relevant back-
ground with the other, less trained students.  The Clinic application also guaran-
tees at least a certain number of scientifically- or technically- trained students in 
the class, and allows me to enroll more students with some business training or 
exposure. 
I also work closely with my contacts at PCI to choose good projects.  It is 
more enjoyable for the students if the company product is related to something 
they understand, if the company has a physical prototype available, and if the 
researchers are eager to work with students.  In addition, all the projects are 
scoped to be completed in one semester, so that two teams of students do not 
have to climb the same steep learning curve to learn the subject matter for any 
one project. 
Pedagogically, the challenge is to provide the right experiences to reinforce 
core clinical concepts like client ownership, effective communication, and coun-
seling.  Unlike with a startup company, the legal assignments from PCI are often 
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neatly described and narrowly focused, such that the students do not have to 
determine what legal work needs to be done.  This is simpler for the students, 
but skips an opportunity for critical thinking that encourages student autonomy.  
Likewise, if too many of the class assignments involve the same client, the stu-
dents lose an opportunity to contrast their experience with that of their peers 
handling a different client.  And finally, because many of the PCI projects are 
linear and concern one question, resulting in one report at the end of the semes-
ter, students do not have as many opportunities to practice client communication 
and ad hoc counseling skills as they would when their client work branches off 
in several directions, covering several subjects and demanding midterm deliver-
ables. 
To address these concerns, I offer each student a varied caseload covering 
different subject matter, different kinds of IP, and different kinds of clients.  
While PCI by percentage provides our most work from semester to semester, 
each student typically works only on one PCI project.  I also try to vary the PCI 
work by taking projects from different departments.  This variety exposes the 
students to the exciting work of the TTO, yet forces them to grapple with the 
challenges of working for other kinds of clients as well.  It also injects fresh 
stories and questions into our case rounds. 
Logistically, there are challenges born of working with a large organization, 
and also predictably from trying to coordinate the schedules of busy people.  For 
the most part, I have been able to surmount these challenges by choosing to work 
with individuals at PCI who see the exciting possibilities for enhancing innova-
tion as well as student learning.  It has also been helpful to designate one “point 
person” at PCI who is knowledgeable about our abilities and limitations to gather 
potential projects for us.  I set aside time to have meetings and discuss projects 
well in advance of the semester start with this point person, and I only choose 
projects that I feel would best meet the needs of both the students and PCI.  Of 
course, semesters of quality work have ensured good deal flow and deeper rela-
tionships built on trust. I nurture that trust by attending as many PCI events as I 
can, speaking at brown bag lunches and outside PCI events, and calling PCI at 
the middle and end of every semester to ensure that the work is going well. 
These substantive, pedagogical, and logistical challenges will vary by institu-
tion, and their poignancy will depend on student makeup, clinic mission, and 
personnel involved.  They are important, but somewhat typical, challenges.  
However, the more surprising and interesting challenges have stemmed from 
tensions presented by doing work for the technology transfer office within the 
bounds of the rules of professional ethics.  The balance of this article explores 
such challenges and some potential solutions. 
IV PROFESSIONAL ETHICS CHALLENGES TO WORKING WITH A TECHNOLOGY 
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TRANSFER OFFICE, AND RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS24 
This final Part IV explores four specific professional ethics challenges that 
we have had to resolve in order to accomplish our work with the tech transfer 
office.  We have had to consider how to: i) bind students to a duty of confiden-
tiality outside of student practice rules; ii) maintain confidentiality and privilege 
when bringing non-lawyer consultants in to consult on a case; iii) maintain con-
fidentiality and privilege and avoid conflicts of interest when projects involve 
two companies; and iv) navigate the mandatory patent disclosure obligation 
when researching technology covered by a pending patent application. 
We had not anticipated having to address these challenges when we started to 
work with PCI.  Each ethical situation was borne of the Clinic’s attempts to re-
spond to a PCI request, often resulting in a change in our policies.  Because the 
PCI relationship was so important to the Clinic, we needed to research and ad-
dress the issues thoughtfully and satisfactorily.  Although confronting the ethical 
issues added a layer of complexity to the administration of the Clinic, it also 
injected valuable discussions of ethics into the seminar.  Most importantly, it 
modeled to the students that representation must be deliberate, responsible, and 
dynamic enough to be responsive to client needs. 
A. Binding Clinic Students to Obligations of Confidentiality 
We confronted our first ethical challenge even before starting our first client 
work for PCI.  One of the bedrock ethical obligations of counsel is to avoid 
revealing confidential client information.25  As a public policy, this obligation 
ensures that clients feel comfortable sharing even damaging information with 
counsel, which allows counsel to provide competent and zealous representa-
tion.26  Clients may release counsel from the obligation only through informed 
 
24  For the remainder of this essay I will refer to the ethical quandaries as relevant to “the 
Clinic students,” with the exception of Part IV(D)(i), since the students are technically prac-
ticing under the supervisor’s license, the ethical quandaries belong to both student and super-
visor.   
25  See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (“The attorney-client 
privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications known to the common 
law. Its purpose is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their 
clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administra-
tion of justice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public 
ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer’s being fully informed by the 
client.” (citation omitted)). 
26  Id. at 388. 
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consent to sharing the information. The ethical duty to retain information in con-
fidence is set forth in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,27 Rule 1.6.28  
However, only attorneys are subject to the rules of professional conduct. Penn’s 
Office of General Counsel (OGC) was worried that the students would not be 
technically obligated nor incentivized to follow the professional code. 
The Detkin IP Clinic is one of nine clinics within Penn Law’s Gittis Center.29  
The Gittis Center’s position on the issue is consistent across clinics—that there 
are sufficient safeguards in place to protect client confidentiality and privilege 
when information is shared with our students.  First, since our students are work-
ing for the “Gittis Center law firm,” we maintain that they are bound to obliga-
tions of confidentiality as would be any personnel at a non-academic law firm.  
In addition, students in litigation clinics are also officially recognized under stu-
dent practice rules in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, which specifically 
permit students that meet certain qualifications to practice law as a Certified Le-
gal Intern under the supervision of licensed attorneys.30  Finally, under MRPC 
Rule 5.3,31 the licensed attorneys supervising the student work are obligated to 
 
27  This article will refer throughout to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC) 
in order to keep the discussion applicable to clinics in different states.  Attorneys practicing 
in Pennsylvania are technically bound by Pennsylvania’s Rules of Professional Conduct 
(Rules); however, the state of Pennsylvania has adopted much of the language of the MRPC 
into its Rules verbatim.  The differences between the two sets of rules do not affect the dis-
cussion in this article, and for other states that have adopted the MRPC, the analysis should 
be the same.  Attorneys that practice before the Unites States Patent and Trademark Office 
are also subject to an additional set of rules, called the USPTO Rules of Professional Conduct, 
discussed and cited in more detail in Section (IV)(D).  See infra note 88 and accompanying 
text.   
28  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (Confidentiality of 
Information states in relevant part that “(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to 
the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, . . . (c) A lawyer shall 
make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthor-
ized access to, information relating to the representation of a client.”).   
29  See Clinics & Externships, UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW SCHOOL, https://www.law.up-
enn.edu/clinic/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2016). 
30  PA. BAR ADMISSION RULES r. 321-22 (PA. BD. OF LAW EXAMINERS 2015) (Requirements 
for formal participation in legal matters by law students and law school graduates and author-
ized activities of certified legal interns).  
31  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (Responsibilities Re-
garding Nonlawyer Assistance states in relevant part: “With respect to a nonlawyer employed 
or retained by or associated with a lawyer: . . . (b)  a lawyer having direct supervisory author-
ity over the nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person’s conduct is 
compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer; and (c)  a lawyer shall be respon-
sible for conduct of such a person that would be a violation of the Rules of Professional Con-
duct if engaged in by a lawyer if: . . . (2) the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial 
authority in the law firm in which the person is employed, or has direct supervisory authority 
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ensure that the students comport with the obligations of all of the Model Rules, 
including MRPC Rule 1.6, or the licensed attorneys will be held responsible.32 
However, Penn’s OGC rightly concluded that: i) unlike when a law firm em-
ploys a paralegal, a law student intern, or other person not admitted to the Penn-
sylvania Bar, our students operate outside of an employment contract that would 
otherwise bind them to uphold obligations to a client, including maintaining cli-
ent confidentiality; ii) it is not clear if the student practice rules in the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania bind students to the ethical obligations that bind licensed 
practitioners, and in any event, because the Detkin IP Clinic is a transactional—
not a litigation—clinic, the student practice rules may not apply to its students 
at all; and iii) although the Clinic’s supervising attorneys are bound to ensure 
that the students uphold their confidentiality obligations, if there were to be a 
breach, PCI would have no direct recourse against the student.33 
A client that is as sophisticated as a university TTO may ask to explore nu-
ances of the law in a way that less sophisticated (and legally represented) clients 
may not.  After many discussions about this issue, we decided to implement 
changes to our policies.  Partly to raise student awareness and ensure compliance 
with the confidentiality obligation for not only PCI, but for all clients, partly 
because of the very sensitive nature of the information involved in PCI work, 
and partly due to the fact that PCI is correct that there is no actual contract bind-
ing transactional clinical students in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, every 
semester the Clinic  students sign a confidential disclosure agreement (CDA) 
 
over the person, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or 
mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.”  Rule 5.3 specifically applies to law 
students working for the firm); id. at cmt. 2 (“Nonlawyers Within the Firm: Lawyers generally 
employ assistants in their practice, including secretaries, investigators, law student interns, 
and paraprofessionals. Such assistants, whether employees or independent contractors, act for 
the lawyer in rendition of the lawyer’s professional services. A lawyer must give such assis-
tants appropriate instruction and supervision concerning the ethical aspects of their employ-
ment, particularly regarding the obligation not to disclose information relating to representa-
tion of the client, and should be responsible for their work product. The measures employed 
in supervising nonlawyers should take account of the fact that they do not have legal training 
and are not subject to professional discipline.” (emphasis added)). 
32  In addition to compliance and confidentiality obligations, it is important that law student 
counselors are included under Rule 5.3 to ensure that the confidential information revealed to 
them under attorney-client privilege remains under attorney-client privilege.  If the students 
constitute outside third parties, privilege could be inadvertently waived.  For a related discus-
sion of including nonlawyers outside the firm under the protection of the attorney-client priv-
ilege, see infra Part IV(B). 
33  Some of these arguments are unique to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, in that our 
student practice rule does not specifically include transactional clinical students, who are not 
certified.  However, depending on the rules in other states, these arguments may apply to other 
clinics as well.   
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directly with the Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania. The CDA person-
ally binds the students to ensure confidentiality, and lays out damages if they 
reveal confidential information.  I explain to the students that they will have to 
sign such an agreement before they may take the Detkin IP Clinic.  So far no 
one has refused to sign, and there have been no known incidents of unauthorized 
disclosure. 
B. Maintaining Confidentiality and Attorney–Client Privilege When Working 
with Nonlawyer Consultants 
However, the ethical issues involving confidentiality do not cease to exist af-
ter the Clinic students sign the CDA.  Sometimes the Clinic specifically needs 
to share confidential client information with outside parties for the sake of the 
client.  This impacts both the duty of confidentiality and potentially the attorney–
client privilege. 
PCI benefits on occasion if the Detkin IP Clinic students share PCI confiden-
tial information with non-legal advisors.  For example, PCI engages students 
from the Wharton School (Penn’s business school) to help its UPstart compa-
nies.  The Wharton students may analyze markets for the UPstart companies’ 
potential products or help refine business plans and pricing strategies.  The busi-
ness information can materially affect the patent research done by the Detkin IP 
Clinic students and vice versa.  If the Wharton students uncover a compelling 
reason to enter a certain market, the Clinic students might recommend a certain 
protection strategy.  If the Clinic students find a strong patent that could preclude 
operating as the product is currently designed, the business counsel might in-
clude seeking a license or even performing a redesign.  PCI would ideally like 
both sets of students to share information, and for the convenience of the inven-
tors, potentially also meet with the inventors at the same time.  Shared infor-
mation and joint meetings are also valuable to the students, as the cross discipli-
nary experience not only enriches the students’ final work product for PCI, but 
allows them to experience the analysis and approach of students trained in an-
other field.34 
However, this scenario requires the Detkin IP Clinic students to reveal PCI 
confidential information to a third party, which would technically be in breach 
of their MRPC Rule 1.6 obligations.35  Even if PCI specifically directed the 
Clinic students to share information with the Wharton students, thus relieving 
the students of their confidentiality obligation through informed consent, PCI 
would still run the risk of waiving attorney–client privilege as to the infor-
mation.36  Some of that information—particularly opinions regarding patent 
 
34  Interdisciplinary communication and experiences are a central theme of the Detkin IP 
Clinic. See Dahl, supra note 2. 
35  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
36  Confidential information shared from client to attorney, and generally information 
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strength or possible infringement—might be harmful to the client if used as ev-
idence in court.  While presenting a pedagogical and counseling advantage, dis-
closure might be problematic. 
Commentators recognize that modern corporate counsel must increasingly in-
corporate information from consultant experts in nonlegal fields when giving 
legal advice on complex issues.37  In order to gather information from these con-
sultant experts, counsel must sometimes reveal and receive confidential infor-
mation.  Counsel may not be as likely to seek the information if they cannot trust 
it to be protected under the attorney–client privilege.38  On the one hand, as a 
matter of public policy we want to encourage counsel to seek helpful advice 
from consultants.  But on the other hand, we need to prevent counsel from shel-
tering otherwise admissible information.39  As a result, even in cases where the 
courts uphold the attorney–client privilege over information shared between 
counsel and non-lawyers outside the firm, the privilege is narrowly drawn.40 
 
shared from attorney to client that constitutes legal advice, may be excluded as evidence at a 
trial so long as it is not disclosed.  Once it is disclosed by either counsel or client, the infor-
mation loses its attorney-client evidentiary privilege. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 73 (AM. LAW INST. 1998). Confidential information may also be pro-
tected by the work-product privilege, but because in our transactional practice we do not con-
sult the Wharton students in preparation for litigation, this essay does not consider the ap-
plicability of that privilege. 
37  Michele D. Beardslee, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: Third-Rate Doctrine 
for Third-Party Consultants, 62 SMU L. REV. 727, 730 (2009). See generally Michele DeSte-
fano, Nonlawyers Influencing Lawyers: Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen or Stone Soup?, 80 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2791 (2012). 
38  Beardslee, supra note 37, at 763-64; cf. Edward J. Imwinkelried & Andrew Amoroso, 
The Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Interactions Among Clients, Attorneys, 
and Experts in the Age of Consultants: the Need for a More Precise, Fundamental Analysis, 
48 HOUS. L. REV. 265, 311 (2011) (stating that assuming that offering a privilege is necessary 
for attorneys to seek advice from consultants is overstated). See generally Melanie B. Leslie, 
The Costs of Confidentiality and the Purpose of Privilege, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 31 (2000) (set-
ting forth the general proposition that we tolerate limiting admissible evidence by virtue of 
applying the attorney-client privilege in order to encourage clients to be truthful with their 
attorneys).  
39  Beardslee, supra note 37, at 733 (citing as an example of abuse of the attorney-client 
privilege public health cases against tobacco companies where counsel specifically oversaw 
external studies on the addictiveness of tobacco in order to attempt to shield the results). 
40  Id. at 733-34 (“This is precisely why the attorney–client privilege, perhaps the most 
robust of privileges, is generally strictly construed.” (citing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 
391, 403 (1976))).  See generally Imwinkelried, supra note 38 (dividing the attorney-client 
privilege analysis into three types of communication, and claiming that while the privilege 
would apply as to information shared from attorney to client and most likely as to information 
shared from attorney to consultant, it should not apply to communications between consult-
ants and attorneys because such communications are not attorney-client).   
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MRPC Rule 5.3 does allow counsel to reveal information for certain 
“Nonlawyer Assistance,” while allowing the attorney–client privilege to remain 
intact.41  Courts often allow this exception in the context of persons that provide 
administrative or support services.42  MRPC Rule 5.3 itself also supports this 
interpretation; the language of the comments explicitly allows lawyers to share 
information with non-lawyers inside the firm that are “assistants” of various 
sorts,43 and non-lawyers outside the firm that provide administrative and support 
services.44 Although the language of MRPC Rule 5.3 does not specifically ex-
clude subject matter experts, a significant number of courts have refused to ex-
tend the privilege that far.45 This exclusion of subject matter experts is in fact 
what we would ask.  In our scenario, the Detkin IP Clinic students would like to 
share information with consultants operating as business subject matter ex-
perts—not administrative experts.  They are not “assistants” to the Clinic stu-
dents.  How can the Clinic students best ensure that they can simultaneously 
uphold their duty of confidentiality and also maintain attorney–client privilege 
over the information they share with and receive from the Wharton consultants? 
When courts make an exception to a waiver of the attorney–client privilege 
 
41  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
42  Beardslee, supra note 37, at 745 (“It is generally safe to assume that the presence of 
non-professional agents, ‘immediate subordinates,’ or ‘ministerial agents’ under the supervi-
sion of the attorney and necessary for an attorney to conduct business such as law clerks, 
paralegals, and secretaries, will not abrogate the privilege” (citations omitted)); Imwinkelried, 
supra 38, at 269 (“As an accommodation to the way that attorneys conduct their business, the 
courts have decided to permit the client and attorney to transmit communications through the 
attorney’s agents, such as a secretary or clerk” (citations omitted)); see infra note 92 (citing 
cases where courts have allowed the privilege to extend to administrative and some non-ad-
ministrative experts).  
43  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.3 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).  
44  See id. at r. 5.3 cmt. 3 (regarding Nonlawyers Outside the Firm: “[a] lawyer may use 
nonlawyers outside the firm to assist the lawyer in rendering legal services to the client.  Ex-
amples include the retention of an investigative or paraprofessional service, hiring a document 
management company to create and maintain a database for complex litigation, sending client 
documents to a third party for printing or scanning, and using an Internet-based service to 
store client information.  When using such services outside the firm, a lawyer must make 
reasonable efforts to ensure that the services are provided in a manner that is compatible with 
the lawyer’s professional obligations.”). Courts have almost universally allowed administra-
tive consultants to be covered under MRPC Rule 5.3.  See Beardslee, supra note 37, at 745; 
Imwinkelried, supra 38, at 269. 
45  See, e.g., United States v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136, 139-40 (2d Cir. 1999) (not applying 
the exception to advice given by an investment banker over tax liability from selling a corpo-
rate subsidiary); FTC v. TRW, Inc., 628 F.2d 207, 209-12 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (research institute 
consultant); In re G-I Holdings Inc., 218 F.R.D. 428, 434 (D.N.J. 2003) (accountant); 
Beardslee, supra note 37, at 745 (“[N]o assumptions are safe when the third party is a profes-
sional consultant.”). 
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for third party consultants, they use two theories: an agency theory or a theory 
of functional equivalents.46 Under the agency theory, courts reason that the priv-
ilege should extend because the consultant is under the control and supervision 
of either the counsel or the client, and the consultant’s aid is necessary for the 
attorney to deliver his counsel to the client.47  Under the functional equivalents 
theory, courts reason that the privilege should extend because the consultant is 
acting as a substitute for the client by providing information that a client em-
ployee or affiliate could otherwise have provided.48  Many courts and commen-
tators require a “nexus” between the consultant’s information and the legal ad-
vice provided as a further prerequisite to privilege.49  Several courts provide 
factors to be weighed to determine whether a nexus exists.50 
With courts extending attorney–client privilege in some, but not all cases 
where counsel shares information with third party subject matter consultants, we 
are careful to create the best set of facts possible.  We attempt to maximize our 
chances of preserving privilege in case we are ever challenged over information 
the Detkin IP Clinic students share with the Wharton consultants.  Specifically, 
the Clinic: i) bolsters the argument that the consultants should be treated as 
agents of the firm and ii) ensures there is a nexus between the information the 
Wharton consultants provide and the legal advice the Clinic gives the clients, 
addressing as many of the court factors as possible to support the nexus argu-
ment. 
First, to support the agency argument, in the Detkin IP Clinic engagement 
letter we specifically bring the Wharton consultants into the Clinic “firm” by 
 
46  Beardslee, supra note 37, at 744.   
47  Id. at 744-45.  This line of cases began with United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d 
Cir. 1961) (finding privilege extends to an accountant who reviewed a client’s financial rec-
ords and acted as an interpreter to provide advice to a firm to help defend a client against 
federal tax violations claims).   
48  See, e.g., In re Beiter, 16 F.3d 929, 937-39 (8th Cir. 1994); Beardslee, supra note 37, at 
748; see also Kim J. Gruetzmacher, Commentary, Privileged Communications with Account-
ants: The Demise of United States v. Kovel, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 977, 987-88 (2003) (describing 
the functional equivalent theory for upholding attorney-client privilege).   
49  Beardslee, supra note 37, at 785-86; id. at 785 n. 298 (citing a list of federal court cases 
and commentators and scholars describing the need for a nexus between the consultant’s in-
formation and the legal counsel provided).   
50  See Beardslee, supra note 37, at 788-94 (describing four factors that courts have used 
to find a nexus between the consultant’s information and the legal counsel provided, includ-
ing: i) the lawyer’s limited skill in the consultant’s area of expertise; ii) defined limitations 
around the methods and degree of dissemination of the consultant’s information; iii) contem-
poraneous proof of the parties’ intention that the consultant provide confidential information 
to support legal counsel; iv) substance of the consultant’s information and the relation to the 
client’s current issues.  The article also describes several factors that courts have used, with 
which the commentator disagrees.). 
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receiving the client’s approval to include consultants as part of our legal team to 
help on the case.51  To address one of the nexus factors, we also explain in the 
engagement letter that by sharing confidential information with the consultants, 
it is not our collective intention to waive the attorney–client privilege.52  The 
Clinic also asks the Wharton consultants to sign a separate consulting agreement 
directly with the Clinic53 that explicitly: i) establishes them as our agents for the 
limited purpose of granting information and advice to us related to our legal 
work for a particular client (agency theory); ii) binds them to an obligation to 
maintain client information in confidence (one of the nexus factors); iii) limits 
how the information they create will be disseminated (one of the nexus factors); 
and iv) specifically enlists them to provide necessary information to assist with 
rendering legal services (the nexus).54 
The language of the engagement letter and the consulting agreement is de-
signed to address both professional ethics and evidentiary concerns.  First, since 
the consulting agreement binds the Wharton students to a duty of confidentiality, 
it helps the Detkin IP Clinic students comply with their obligation under MRPC 
Rules 1.6 and 5.3 to make “reasonable efforts to ensure that the [consultant’s] 
conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer.”55  Sec-
ond, both agreements describe the consultants’ role, deliverables, and obliga-
tions in a way designed to help safeguard the attorney–client privilege.  The 
consultants are specifically characterized as “agents” of the counsel and are en-
listed to “assist with rendering legal services”—language reflecting the agency 
theory applied by some courts extending the privilege and the specific language 
of MRPC Rule 5.3 comment [3].56  Also, the consultants’ work is described as 
“necessary” to assist with “rendering legal services,” which language, together 
with careful limitations about how the advice can be disseminated, and the fact 
that we are entering into a contract defining a relationship, all address factors 
 
51  See, e.g., infra Form 1.  
52  Id.  
53  See, e.g., infra Form 2. 
54  PCI already requires the Wharton students to enter a CDA with PCI.  The separate 
consulting agreement between the Wharton students and the Detkin IP Clinic, however, is 
necessary in order to safeguard attorney-client privilege.  Besides the fact that the Wharton-
PCI CDA might not cover information that the Clinic shares with Wharton as opposed to the 
information that PCI shares, the consulting agreement also makes it clear that the Wharton 
students are subject to obligations of confidentiality in the context of working with the Clinic 
to supplement our legal advice.  This is a nexus factor to maintain the attorney-client privilege.   
55   MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).  See also id. at r. 1.6 
cmt. 18 (“Paragraph (c) requires a lawyer to act competently to safeguard information relating 
to the representation of a client against unauthorized access by third parties and against inad-
vertent or unauthorized disclosure by the lawyer or other persons who are participating in the 
representation of the client or who are subject to the lawyer’s supervision.”).  
56  See id. r. 5.3 cmt.2.   
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that can weigh in favor of establishing a nexus between the consultants’ contri-
butions and the resulting legal counsel. 
However, merely including certain language in our contracts does not neces-
sarily make the characterizations a reality.  In order to best safeguard the attor-
ney–client privilege, the Clinic students must first also take the right actions, 
mainly targeting the use of shared information as much as possible toward ad-
ministering legal advice.  The scope of the consulting is narrow and defined.  
Second, the Clinic students only reveal as much legal confidential information 
as is necessary for the Wharton students to provide business context for the re-
sulting advice.  Finally, the Clinic students must bear in mind that purely busi-
ness advice—regardless of source—will likely not be subject to the attorney–
client privilege (even if it is still subject to confidentiality obligations). 
Although it could be somewhat awkward for the Detkin IP Clinic students to 
instruct the Wharton students on the subject of ethical duties and refer to them 
in writing as “agents,” the Clinic students explain to the business students why 
the construct is necessary and it ends up being an interesting lesson for both 
teams.57  The law and business students discuss duties of confidentiality and 
evidentiary privilege and how those concepts impact the delivery of legal work. 
Both sets of students emerge more knowledgeable and confident in how to apply 
the rules. 
C. Maintaining Confidentiality and Privilege and Managing Conflicts of 
Interest with Projects Involving Two Companies 
1) Sharing Information with the UPstart Company 
Besides sharing information with Wharton students, Detkin IP Clinic students 
on UPstart projects often feel pressure to share confidential information about 
the project with the UPstart inventors and the UPstart company.  But even if the 
confidential information directly concerns the UPstart company, if PCI is the 
Clinic client, sharing the information with the UPstart company is technically a 
breach of client confidentiality and could waive attorney–client privilege. 
The manner in which the students work on the PCI project contributes to this 
pressure.  Although PCI employees assign the project, they often instruct the 
students to meet with the inventor or other members of the UPstart company 
team with or without a PCI representative present.  Students follow up directly 
with the inventor and the UPstart company.  Over the course of the semester, the 
students often establish a deep relationship with the inventors, even coming to 
 
57  Business consultants are not bound by a specific professional code of ethics, so it is a 
new and somewhat interesting experience for them to experience their legal colleagues’ ef-
forts —and even struggles—to comply with the Model Rules.  For the law students, they learn 
from having to explain the existence of the Model Rules to their business colleagues, and to 
interpret them given a set of facts.  
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know them better than they know their contacts at PCI.  As a result, the students 
can forget to whom they owe their duty of confidentiality, leading potentially to 
ethical indiscretions as well as conflicts of interest. 
For example, research results are technically PCI confidential information be-
cause the project is being done for PCI. During the meetings the inventors may—
innocently or not—ask Clinic students to relay their research results.  The UP-
start company may also ask for information that PCI may not want to discuss 
with the inventors, even though it is relevant to the UPstart company’s success, 
for example PCI’s decisions around patent prosecution for the invention tech-
nology.  In addition, the UPstart inventors expect to see drafts of the students’ 
work, as well as the finished report.  And sometimes the inventors express very 
different opinions about project priorities than the opinions of PCI.  Each of 
these situations places the Clinic students in the awkward position of having to 
demur, which is especially difficult when they meet most often with the inven-
tor. 
We have always navigated the ethical boundaries these situations present by 
explaining to the inventors upfront and throughout the semester that we are not 
their counsel and, when they ask for information, inform them that the infor-
mation can come to them through PCI, but not through us.  Although awkward, 
we practice in class through simulation how to convey this message in a way 
that we hope will not alienate the inventors.  However, this has never been a 
perfect solution, as even when delivered with empathy and an explanation, the 
inventors are seldom satisfied by the answer.  More importantly, although rely-
ing on PCI to share the end report with the UPstart companies allows the students 
to uphold their duty of confidentiality, PCI’s report sharing with the UPstart 
company is still disclosure that likely waives attorney–client privilege. 
We wanted to find a way for the UPstart company to view PCI’s report with-
out PCI waiving attorney–client privilege or forcing the Detkin IP Clinic stu-
dents to breach the duty of confidentiality.  We first considered the “community 
interest” or “common interest” privilege,58 which some states, including the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, have adopted into their case law,59 and many 
 
58  The privilege goes by many different names. See Matthew D. LaBrie, The Common 
Interest Privilege, TRIAL EVIDENCE (Am. Bar. Ass’n, Litigation Section), Sept. 30, 2014, at 2. 
(“Though it goes by many names—’pooled information privilege,’ ‘joint defense privilege,’ 
‘community of interest privilege,’ ‘allied litigant privilege,’ and so on—the common interest 
privilege, regardless of the name, has a simple function: it extends the attorney client privi-
lege—and in some jurisdictions, attorney work product protection—beyond an attorney and 
his or her client to a third party.”). 
59  See Karoly v. Mancuso, 65 A.3d 301, 315 (Pa. 2013) (“[U]nder the prevailing law of 
this Commonwealth, the joint-client or common-interest privilege could potentially apply”); 
King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. Cephalon Inc. et al., 2:06-cv-1797, 4 (E.D. Pa., July 5, 
2011) (Mem.); Young v. Presbyterian Homes, Inc., No. 2000-C-990, 2001 WL 35948690, at 
*7 (Pa.Com.Pl. Jan. 16, 2001).  
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courts have applied.60  The common interest doctrine allows two separately rep-
resented parties to share confidential information between themselves without 
waiving attorney–client privilege.  The doctrine applies to the extent the parties 
share a common interest and their attorneys are better able to provide counsel 
because the information has been shared.61  This evidentiary doctrine is rooted 
in joint defense arrangements,62 but has been broadened specifically to apply to 
transactional situations as well.63 
However, it is far from certain that the privilege would protect all disclosure 
situations akin to sharing PCI information with the UPstart company.  First, ju-
risdictions vary widely in their interpretation of when, how, and even if the com-
munity interest privilege applies.64  Second, even in the Third Circuit (encom-
passing Philadelphia) where the doctrine is acknowledged, there is very little 
case law to guide its interpretation, and the most extensive discussion of the 
doctrine is in In re Teleglobe,65 a Third Circuit case that relies on Delaware, not 
Pennsylvania, law.66  Finally, the requirements for the common interest privilege 
 
60  See Robert A. Matthews, Jr., Annotated Patent Digest § 42:35 (Sept. 2016) (listing 
cases from a variety of districts and circuits). 
61  See e.g., United States v. Under Seal, 902 F.2d 244, 249 (4th Cir. 1990) (“Whether an 
action is ongoing or contemplated, whether the jointly interested persons are defendants or 
plaintiffs, and whether the litigation or potential litigation is civil or criminal, the rationale for 
the joint defense rule remains unchanged: persons who share a common interest in litigation 
should be able to communicate with their respective attorneys and with each other to more 
effectively prosecute or defend their claims.”). 
62  In re Teleglobe Commc’ns. Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 364 (3d Cir. 2007). 
63  Id. (“Thus, the community-of-interest privilege allows attorneys representing different 
clients with similar legal interests to share information without having to disclose it to others. 
It applies in civil and criminal litigation, and even in purely transactional contexts.” (citing 
PAUL R. RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 4:35 (2d ed. 1999); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76 (AM. LAW INST. 1998))).  
64  LaBrie, supra note 58, at 5. 
65  See Teleglobe, 493 F.3d 345 passim (2007). 
66  LaBrie, supra note 58, at 12. (“[In PA], judicial opinions are few, rely on precedents 
from other jurisdictions, and do not clearly acknowledge that the privilege exists.” (citing 
Karoly v. Mancuso, 65 A.3d 301, 315 (Pa. 2013))). The Teleglobe case, although providing 
good guidance, applies the Delaware Rules of Evidence, which specifically address the com-
munity interest privilege, unlike the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence. Teleglobe, 493 F.3d at 
364. The King case from the EDPA, which nonetheless cites Teleglobe approvingly, catego-
rizes the precedential value as follows: “The Court’s pronouncements in Teleglobe on the 
community-of-interest privilege were not dispositive to the outcome of the case. Moreover, 
some, but not all, of the Court’s reasoning seemed to be premised on Delaware Rules of Evi-
dence, 1 Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege in the United States § 4:35 (2d ed. 2009); 
and/or the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 76 (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
Nonetheless, the Court’s examination of the community-of-interest privilege is instructive to 
my analysis.” King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. Cephalon Inc. et al., 2:06-cv-1797, 4 n.3 
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to apply as described in In Re Teleglobe are not present in our case.  According 
to In re Teleglobe, for the community interest privilege to apply, the parties shar-
ing information must be represented by separate counsel,67 must share a substan-
tially similar legal interest in the information,68 and counsel for each party must 
share the information.69  In our situation, the parties are not each represented by 
different counsel, and because the parties themselves each wish to access the 
information, the doctrine does not seem to apply to our situation, at least as the 
doctrine has been interpreted in the Third Circuit. 
However, the parties might also share information under another arrange-
ment, namely when the two parties are joint clients (or co-clients) of the same 
counsel.  When co-clients share information, the information remains privileged; 
the construct acts as an exception to a waiver of the attorney–client privilege.70  
 
(E.D. Pa., July 5, 2011) (Mem.). 
67  Teleglobe, 493 F.3d at 365 (“[T]he privilege only applies when clients are represented 
by separate counsel.”). 
68  King, at 5 (“[T]he Third Circuit has found that ‘it is sufficient to recognize that members 
of the community of interest must share at least a substantially similar legal interest.” (citing 
Teleglobe 493 F.3d at 365)); see also Michael Pavento et al., Applicability of the Common 
Interest Doctrine for Preservation of Attorney-Client Privileged Materials Disclosed During 
Intellectual Property Due Diligence Investigations, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DESK 
REFERENCE 353, 356 (6th ed.), available at https://clients.kilpatricktownsend.com/IPDeskRef-
erence/Documents/IPDeskRef.pdf [https://perma.cc/XQ9Z-7XHF] (“Courts in the Third Cir-
cuit have generally held that the parties to a disclosure need only demonstrate that the shared 
interest is similar, not identical, in order for the common interest doctrine to apply.  However, 
there is another line of cases in the Third Circuit in which courts have apparently looked to 
precedents in other circuits in holding that the nature of the common interest must be identical. 
It is unlikely that this uncertainty will be eliminated without appellate intervention.”).  But 
see Katz v. AT&T Corp., 191 F.R.D 433, 437-38 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (because the parties did not 
yet have a license agreement in place at the time the privileged information was shared, they 
failed to show they had an identical legal interest, so the privilege was waived).  In addition, 
to maintain the privilege, the shared interest must contain at least some legal concerns. King, 
at 6 (“Courts examining this issue have indeed found that the shared interest must be ‘legal.’”).  
See also id. at n.4 (“I note that the privilege may apply even where communications included 
discussion of various business considerations, as long as the communication was ‘infused 
with legal concerns.’” (quoting Transp. Auth. v. Caremarkpcs Health, L.P., 254 F.R.D. 253, 
258 (E.D. Pa. 2008))). 
69  Teleglobe, 493 F.3d at 364-65 (“The requirement that the clients’ separate attorneys 
share information (and not the clients themselves) derives from the community-of-interest 
privilege’s roots in the old joint-defense privilege, which (to repeat) was developed to allow 
attorneys to coordinate their clients’ criminal defense strategiesFalse The attorney-sharing 
requirement helps prevent abuse by ensuring that the common-interest privilege only sup-
plants the disclosure rule when attorneys, not clients, decide to share information in order to 
coordinate legal strategies.”).   
70  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §75 (AM. LAW INST. 1998) 
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A joint client or co-client arrangement must be intentionally created by the par-
ties71 but applies equally when the parties already have a corporate relationship 
and when they do not.72  This is a better solution for our situation. 
In a joint client relationship, one counsel can share information equally across 
both clients without fear of waiving the attorney–client privilege.73  This solu-
tion is very helpful for our scenario.  With both PCI and the UPstart company in 
a joint client relationship, the Clinic can share the research and reports it creates 
with each client without forcing a client to choose between not sharing the in-
formation with the other client, or risking waiving privilege. The Clinic students 
may add information to the report knowing its privilege is more secure, even if 
the information could potentially be damaging to the parties if it were to be re-
vealed in court.  In addition, with both parties able to view and comment on the 
report, the Clinic students get helpful feedback from each party, which can en-
sure a higher quality product. 
Of course, in establishing a joint client relationship, the Detkin IP Clinic also 
must avoid creating a conflict of interest in violation of Rule 1.7 of the Model 
Rules.  Attorneys may not represent two clients when “there is a significant risk 
 
(Regarding the privilege of co-clients: “(1) If two or more persons are jointly represented by 
the same lawyer in a matter, a communication of either co-client that otherwise qualifies as 
privileged under §§ 68-72 and relates to matters of common interest is privileged as against 
third persons, and any co-client may invoke the privilege, unless it has been waived by the 
client who made the communication.”).   
71  Teleglobe, 493 F.3d at 362 (“[C]lients of the same lawyer who share a common interest 
are not necessarily co-clients. Whether individuals have jointly consulted a lawyer or have 
merely entered concurrent but separate representations is determined by the understanding of 
the parties and the lawyer in light of the circumstances.  Co-client representations must also 
be distinguished from situations in which a lawyer represents a single client, but another per-
son with allied interests cooperates with the client and the client’s lawyer.” (citing the 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §75 cmt. c)). 
72  See, e.g., Teleglobe, 493 F.3d at 353 (finding privilege where the joint clients were 
parent and subsidiary); Kirsch v. Brightstar Corp., 68 F.Supp. 3d 846, 855 (N.D.Ill. 2014) 
(finding where one client entity was partially owned by another client entity, but the court 
specifically refuted plaintiff’s argument claiming that for privilege to apply, the joint clients 
must include a subsidiary that is wholly owned by a parent, stating “[t]he co-client doctrine 
simply requires an attorney to represent different clients involved in the same litigation, which 
is the case here.”); Magnetar Technologies Corp. v. Six Flags Theme Park Inc., 886 F.Supp. 
2d 466, 472 (D. Del. 2012) (finding privilege where joint clients had a licensor/licensee rela-
tionship); The Jordan Inv. Co., Ltd. v. Hunter Green Inv. Ltd., No. 00 Civ. 9214(RWS), 2006 
WL 2773022, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2006) (finding privilege where clients were separate 
legal entities, including a fund, an investment manager and an administrator).   
73  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §75 cmt. c. 
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that the representation of one . . . client[ ] will be materially limited by . . . re-
sponsibilities to another client . . . .”74  There are indeed scenarios where the in-
terests of PCI could conflict with the interests of the UPstart company, even 
though both PCI and the UPstart companies are technically “Penn,” in that the 
inventor is a University of Pennsylvania employee and PCI is the university-
owned tech transfer office.  As an example, the UPstart company may in fact 
also employ non Penn-affiliated people.  And more importantly, although PCI 
has an ownership interest in the UPstart company and wants it to succeed, as the 
owner of the underlying technology supporting the invention, sometimes PCI 
might disagree with the UPstart company as to whether and how to pursue patent 
protection. 
However, even when two clients are not perfectly aligned on all issues, rep-
resenting both clients does not necessarily lead to a conflict of interest.  First, 
the representation can be limited to matters of common interest only.  The Clinic 
never handles work where its representation would be directly adverse to the 
other client, for example representing either party in a licensing negotiation over 
the PCI-owned IP.  Scoping the representation is not an unusual strategy in the 
co-client scenario.75  Second, counsel can also monitor the representation and 
 
74  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) states:   
“(a)  Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of in-
terest exists if: 
  (1)  the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or 
  (2)  there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be 
materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client or 
a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer. 
(b)  Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under paragraph 
(a), a lawyer may represent a client if: 
  (1)  the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent 
and diligent representation to each affected client; 
  (2)  the representation is not prohibited by law; 
  (3)  the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against 
another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding 
before a tribunal; and 
  (4)  each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.” 
75  See Teleglobe, 493 F.3d at 362-63 (“While it is permissible for lawyers and clients to 
limit the scope of representation in a single-client representation, it is particularly common in 
co-client situations because of the limited congruence of the clients’ interests. As the Restate-
ment notes, a co-client relationship is limited by ‘the extent of the legal matter of common 
interest.’ While written agreements limiting the scope of a joint representation might be pref-
erable, nothing requires this so long as the parties understand the limitations.” (citing 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 19)). 
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withdraw from certain subject matters should interests start to diverge.76  For 
example, although we have not yet done this work for UPstart companies, the 
Clinic might cease prosecuting a patent if the UPstart company and PCI devel-
oped conflicting strategies about the scope of its coverage.  In the Ventures work 
that we usually do for UPstart companies,77 the interests of PCI and the UPstart 
company are aligned around the representation, the subject of which is usually 
research related to the company’s best commercialization strategy given its IP 
status.  Since the interests of the clients remain aligned throughout the period of 
representation, representation of neither client is “materially limited by [the 
Clinic’s] responsibilities to another client.” Defining the project clearly and lim-
iting representation only to that project avoids the risk of developing a conflict 
of interest. 
Yet, if even despite best efforts to scope the project and to monitor represen-
tation when interests diverge, a concurrent conflict of interest should arise, coun-
sel may still continue to represent both clients under Rule 1.7 with certain cave-
ats.  According to Rule 1.7, counsel must reasonably believe despite the 
concurrent conflict of interest that she can “provide competent and diligent rep-
resentation to each affected client,” the representation must not be “prohibited 
by law,” the representation must not involve the two clients being adverse in a 
litigation or before a tribunal, and the clients must give informed consent.78  Put 
another way, the rules of professional conduct allow a lawyer to counsel multiple 
clients over the same matter so long as all clients consent, and there is no sub-
stantial risk of the lawyer being unable to fulfill her duties to all of them.79 
Even though the Clinic carefully defines the scope of representation to avoid 
possible conflicts of interest, the Clinic must be ready for the situation where 
clients’ interests might start to diverge.  We have established a procedure where 
the Clinic engagement letter binds both parties to the engagement specifically as 
joint clients, indicates that there may be a limited number of potentially adverse 
situations, and asks specifically for each client to give informed consent to the 
arrangement, clearly stating that at some point their interests may diverge.  We 
then set out the scope of the representation, which is designed to only include 
 
76  See id., 493 F.3d at 373 (describing the situation where counsel represents a parent and 
a wholly-owned subsidiary: “It is inevitable that on occasion parents and subsidiaries will see 
their interests diverge, particularly in spin-off, sale, and insolvency situations. When this hap-
pens, it is wise for the parent to secure for the subsidiary outside representationFalse That the 
companies should have separate counsel on the matter of the spin-off transaction, however, 
does not mean that the parent’s in-house counsel must cease representing the subsidiary on 
all other matters.”). 
77  See supra Part II(C)(3). 
78  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7. 
79  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 128-31 (AM. LAW 
INST. 1998). 
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common interests.  If despite our efforts client interests begin to diverge materi-
ally such that there is a concurrent conflict of interest and the Clinic can no 
longer provide competent, diligent counsel, we state in the engagement letter 
that we will withdraw from that part of the representation.  Additionally, if no 
part of the representation can be salvaged, we will withdraw entirely from rep-
resenting the UPstart company.  This policy is designed to prevent the Clinic 
from running afoul of the ethical rules, but also to avoid the risk of creating any 
information that one party could use as evidence against the other in any future 
litigation between the parties.80 
The final question is whether the Clinic could ever truly represent the UPstart 
company without the representation being “materially limited by the lawyer’s 
responsibilities to another client,”81 namely PCI.  Since the Clinic is funded by 
Penn Law School, which, like PCI is affiliated with the University of Pennsyl-
vania, it is worth at least pondering whether the university affiliation to both the 
Clinic and PCI causes the Clinic’s interests to align more with PCI than with the 
UPstart company.  However, the Clinic’s affiliation with Penn does not change 
the conflict of interest analysis.  First, the UPstart company also has a close af-
filiation with the University of Pennsylvania.  But even putting that nexus aside, 
as with any client, the Clinic is always bound to analyze in any one situation 
whether its ability to represent one client is at significant risk of being materially 
limited by its responsibilities to the other client.  The Clinic avoids conflicts by 
scoping the representation to be over common interests only.  As soon as the 
Clinic’s affiliation with Penn materially limits its ability to provide representa-
tion to the UPstart company, either the Clinic needs to withdraw, or it needs to 
seek informed consent.  In other words, the Clinic’s Penn affiliation is only an 
issue if the clients have diverging interests.  If the clients have diverging inter-
ests, then the Clinic should consider withdrawing either partially or completely 
from the representation under Rule 1.7 in any event. 
Addressing the tricky conflict of interest questions through a measured yet 
responsive step-by-step process protects both the Clinic and the clients.  The 
resulting joint-client arrangement allows the Clinic to share its legal analysis at 
the same time with both the UPstart company and PCI, while feeling secure that 
it can avoid conflict of interest issues, maintain the all-important duty of confi-
dentiality, and preserve the critical attorney–client privilege. 
 
80  Teleglobe, 493 F.3d at 366 (“The great caveat of the joint-client privilege is that it only 
protects communications from compelled disclosure to parties outside the joint representa-
tion. When former co-clients sue one another, the default rule is that all communications made 
in the course of the joint representation are discoverable. This rule has two bases: (1) the 
presumed intent of the parties, and (2) the lawyer’s fiduciary obligation of candor to both 
parties.” (citing DEL. R. EVID. § 502(d)(6); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS § 75(2) & cmt. d.). 
81  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7. 
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2. Sharing Information with Prospective Investors 
As a final scenario implicating sharing confidential information, UPstart com-
panies sometimes ask the Detkin IP Clinic students to send the final report out 
to third party investors while still preserving attorney–client privilege.82  The 
attorney–client privilege to such information would likely be compromised if 
the UPstart company were to send the report to the investors themselves, but 
would the information remain privileged if the Clinic students sent the infor-
mation to the investors’ counsel?83  Under a line of common interest or commu-
nity interest cases, depending on the circumstances and reasons for the infor-
mation to be shared, some courts might answer yes.  Courts differ on what 
constitutes a “common legal interest,”84 between the parties, and whether in or-
der to be subject to the common interest doctrine, the legal interests must be 
 
82  This analysis focuses on the privilege issues and assumes for the sake of argument that 
the investors would also agree to be bound by a confidential disclosure agreement to preserve 
the confidentiality of the information.  
83  See, e.g. Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 263 F.R.D. 142, 146 (D. Del. 2009) 
(“Moreover, to qualify for and to maintain continued protection, the communication must be 
shared between counsel. Recognizing that the common interest privilege operates in deriva-
tion of disclosure, the attorney-sharing requirement prevents abuse, such as, post hoc justifi-
cation for a client’s impermissible disclosures.”). 
84  Is an interest in ascertaining the value of a company enough to constitute a “common 
legal interest?”  In one case, the court did not uphold the community interest privilege when 
an investor and a potential target shared a patent opinion that evaluated a third party’s patents 
during a business negotiation. Corning Inc. v. SRU Biosystems, LLC, 223. F.R.D. 189, 190 
(D. Del. 2004) (“[The] disclosures . . . were made not in an effort to formulate a joint defense 
but rather to persuade [a potential business partner] to invest in SRU. Accordingly, the Court 
concludes that SRU has failed to demonstrate that the parties had agreed to a joint defense 
strategy or that the opinions were a precaution against anticipated joint litigation.” (citations 
omitted)).  However, other courts have upheld the privilege over shared information, whether 
or not in the context of anticipated litigation. See Britesmile, Inc. v. Discus Dental Inc., No. 
C 02-3220 JSW (JL) (N. D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2004) (order denying plaintiff’s discovery request) 
(court upheld privilege on a business promotion rationale when the defendant party shared a 
patent opinion letter created by its counsel with the owner of the patent it was interested in 
purchasing); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch, 115 F.R.D. 308, 311 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (privilege 
upheld primarily for public policy reasons when court could not decide whether the facts of 
the case sufficiently met the test to constitute a community of interest, when one party shared 
an opinion letter analyzing its possible infringement of a third party’s patents with a potential 
purchaser) (“Holding that this kind of disclosure constitutes a waiver could make it apprecia-
bly more difficult to negotiate sales of businesses and products that arguably involve interests 
protected by laws relating to intellectual property. Unless it serves some significant interest 
courts should not create procedural doctrine that restricts communication between buyers and 
sellers, erects barriers to business deals, and increases the risk that prospective buyers will not 
have access to important information that could play key roles in assessing the value of the 
business or product they are considering buying.”).  
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identical, or merely similar, and if the interests can ever be identical if the parties 
are not yet aligned.85  However, some courts have in fact extended the privilege 
to potential investors, with facts similar to what the UPstart companies ask the 
Detkin IP Clinic to do.86 
However, for a variety of reasons, we have decided not to rely to heavily on 
this possibility.  Because the community interest privilege is often applied nar-
rowly, because the investor itself—instead of its counsel—might like to review 
the Clinic report, and because the information shared in the Clinic report is po-
tentially so sensitive, Clinic policy is never to share client information with an 
investor or any other third party.  The Clinic students never assume that the com-
munity interest doctrine will apply.  In fact, when PCI or the UPstart company 
informs the Detkin IP Clinic that any of our reports might end up in any third 
party’s hands, even a friendly party like a potential investor, the Clinic students 
are very careful about what they commit to writing, lest the attorney–client priv-
ilege be compromised and the information end up in court. 
D. Navigating Disclosure Obligations When Researching Technology with a 
Pending Patent Application 
A final challenge of professional ethics facing the students working on PCI 
projects involves a possible “duty to disclose” when researching patented tech-
nology.  Among other requirements, in order to receive a U.S. patent, a technol-
ogy must be “novel.”87  This means that the technology was not disclosed pre-
viously by anyone else anywhere in the world before the filing date of the patent 
application; any such disclosure would be considered “prior art.”  In order to 
ensure the integrity of the patent process, throughout the entire prosecution until 
the patent issues, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) re-
quires certain defined parties to disclose all potential prior art they discover. 
Clinic students doing landscape analyses, for example, review dozens of patents 
in the relevant space.  Even if they may be searching patents for reasons unre-
lated to patent prosecution, the students could potentially uncover a patent or 
application that might be considered material prior art. 
This duty to disclose is described in the USPTO Rules of Professional Con-
duct,88 and applies not only to inventors and the filing agent or attorney, but also 
 
85  See also Katz v. AT&T Corp., 191 F.R.D 433, 437-38 (E.D. Pa. 2000); LaBrie, supra 
note 58, at 5; see supra Part IV(C)(1).  
86  To maximize the chances that the information would remain covered by the privilege, 
the Clinic should also ensure that the investor is separately represented by counsel, and the 
information is shared with that investor counsel. See supra Part IV(C)(1).   
87  35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).   
88  37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2015).  The USPTO Rules of Professional Conduct (USPTO Rules) 
are a set of rules guiding the conduct of patent agents and patent and trademark attorneys who 
practice before the USPTO, which were implemented in April, 2013, by amendment of 37 
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to any “other person who is substantively involved in the preparation or prose-
cution of the application and who is associated with the inventor, the applicant, 
an assignee, or anyone to whom there is an obligation to assign the applica-
tion.”89  In other words, the duty to disclose applies to persons who had more 
than an administrative or secretarial role in prosecuting the patent.90  If this duty 
to disclose is not met: i) the individual with the duty may have violated his/her 
ethical obligations under the USPTO Rules;91 and perhaps more to the point for 
 
C.F.R. Sections 1, 2, 7, 10, 11 and 41.  Attorneys who practice before the USPTO are subject 
to both the USPTO Rules and the MRPC as implemented by their home state, but the 2013 
USPTO Rules amendments were enacted to bring the two sets of rules into better alignment. 
See generally Changes to Representation of Others Before the United States Patent and Trade-
mark Office, 78 Fed. Reg. 20180 (Apr. 3, 2013). The USPTO Rules are more extensive, and 
include provisions like the duty to disclose that are not applicable to general practitioners.  
See, e.g., ABA and USPTO Rule Comparison Chart, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK 
OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/oed/AbavsUSPTO.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3HJ-
TC72] (last visited Apr. 9, 2016).  Some of the USPTO Rules are also included or further 
explained in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedures (the “MPEP”).  See generally MPEP 
(9th ed. Rev. 7, Nov. 2015). 
89  37 C.F.R. § 1.56 reads in part:  
(a) . . . Each individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent applica-
tion has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the Office, which includes a 
duty to disclose to the Office all information known to that individual to be material 
to patentability as defined in this section . . . 
(c) Individuals associated with the filing or prosecution of a patent application within 
the meaning of this section are:(1) Each inventor named in the application;(2) Each 
attorney or agent who prepares or prosecutes the application; and(3) Every other per-
son who is substantively involved in the preparation or prosecution of the application 
and who is associated with the inventor, the applicant, an assignee, or anyone to whom 
there is an obligation to assign the application. 
90  Avid Identification Systems, Inc. v. Crystal Import Corp., 603 F.3d 967, 974 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (citing MPEP § 2001.01 (8th ed., rev. 2, May 2004)). 
91  37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a); see also id. at § 11.303(e) (listing the duty of disclosure as one 
aspect of a general duty of candor and good faith in practicing before the tribunal).  
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the client, ii) the patent might be subject to an allegation of inequitable con-
duct.92  Although inequitable conduct is very hard to prove,93 the consequences 
of a finding are dire.  If a court finds that the patentee (or its counsel) engaged 
in inequitable conduct, the patent will not issue or will be subject to cancella-
tion.94 
The students are working for PCI, so they could potentially be associated with 
the assignee of the application.  By working on UPstart technology that is still 
patent pending, are the students “substantively involved in the preparation or 
prosecution of the application” enough that the duty to disclose would attach?  
Separately, if the Clinic student team reveals information to PCI, does that trig-
ger a duty to disclose for PCI?  What implications does that have for the Detkin 
IP Clinic students’ projects? 
1) Obligations of Disclosure for Detkin IP Clinic Students 
The most relevant set of facts would be if the Clinic students uncovered pos-
sible prior art that could impact an active patent application and that was not 
duplicative of other information already disclosed to the USPTO, which in the 
students’ judgment was in fact material to the issuance of the patent.  Of course, 
 
92  See generally Therasense v. Becton, 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011); 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) 
(“However, no patent will be granted on an application in connection with which fraud on the 
Office was practiced or attempted or the duty of disclosure was violated through bad faith or 
intentional misconduct.”); see also MPEP § 2010 (9th ed. Rev. 7, Mar. 2014) (discussing the 
proper forum to adjudicate an allegation of inequitable conduct, including an allegation based 
on a violation of 37 C.F.R. § 1.56); Stephen M. Lund, Note, Adjusting the Individual Duty of 
Disclosure to Meet the Reality of Corporate Participation in Patent Prosecution, 3 DREXEL 
L. REV. 583, 591 (2011) (“When an applicant fails to satisfy the duty to disclose, he violates 
the duty of candor and good faith, and thus commits inequitable conduct. Applicants violate 
the duty to disclose when they misrepresent or omit material information, or submit false 
material information to the PTO. While applicants must disclose any information material to 
patentability, the typical examples of matters involved in an inequitable conduct claim include 
prior art references, information connected to statutory bars, and data regarding the subject 
matter of the patent application.” (citations omitted)).   
93  In order to prove inequitable conduct, a party must show: i) materiality of the omitted 
information and ii) intent to deceive the USPTO.  Not only is direct evidence to prove the 
elements difficult by nature to uncover, but also the party must prove the elements by clear 
and convincing evidence.  In addition, the recent case of Therasense v. Becton raised the 
standard for the materiality element, such that it is not met unless the party alleging inequita-
ble conduct can show that the patent would have issued “but for” the omitted citation. See 
generally Therasense v. Becton, 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
94  Since an issued patent may be challenged and invalidated later in court because of prior 
art that had not been reviewed previously by the patent examiner, it may also be strategically 
wise to submit all possible prior art to the examiner for consideration while the patent is still 
under review.  This Part does not weigh in on the question of strategic value.  It rather focuses 
specifically on whether certain parties must disclose under the USPTO Rules. 
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if there were no active patent applications at issue, or if the students only dis-
covered duplicative or non-material citations, then there would be no quan-
dary.95  The remainder of this Part will only assume that the students find them-
selves in such a worst-case scenario.  Given these facts, do the students have a 
duty to disclose, putting the issuance or enforceability of the patent at risk if they 
do not turn over their possible prior art citations? 
Since the Detkin IP Clinic students are neither the inventors nor the prosecut-
ing agents or attorneys, the duty to disclose would only apply if the students 
were “substantively involved in the preparation or prosecution of the applica-
tion.”96 Although few courts have had occasion to interpret the meaning of the 
phrase and apply the concept to decide whether it triggered a duty to disclose, 
the standard for “substantial involvement” was discussed specifically by the 
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in Avid Identification Systems, Inc. v. Crystal 
Import Corp: 
What constitutes “substantive[] involve[ment] in the preparation or prose-
cution of the application,” the issue on which this case turns, has not pre-
viously been addressed by this court. We read “substantively involved” to 
mean that the involvement relates to the content of the application or deci-
sions related thereto, and that the involvement is not wholly administrative 
or secretarial in nature.97 
Applying this standard, the Avid court was in fact willing to extend a duty of 
disclosure to the president of the assignee company, who was not the inventor 
and had not himself filed the patent applications.98  However, in cases that have 
applied Avid since, courts have been reluctant to extend the duty of disclosure 
that far, finding that unless the person was involved with reviewing parts of the 
application when it was being prosecuted or were substantively involved in mak-
ing prosecution decisions, no duty attaches.99  Further, these courts also charac-
terize the facts of the Avid case as unique: in Avid, the duty of disclosure applied 
 
95  There is a separate question as to whether the students have the requisite understanding 
to know whether any reference is “material” to the prosecution, not being practitioners yet, 
and in many cases not familiar with patent prosecution.  But for purposes of this analysis, we 
should assume they could determine whether any given reference is material.   
96  37 C.F.R. § 1.56(c) (2015). 
97  Avid Identification Systems, Inc. v. Crystal Import Corp., 603 F.3d 967, 974 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (citing MPEP § 2001.01 (8th ed., rev. 2, May 2004)).   
98  Id. 
99  See CSB-System Intern. Inc. v. SAP America, Inc., No. 10–2156, 2012 WL 1645582, 
at *8-11  (E.D. Pa. May 10, 2012) (Mem.) (finding that a German attorney who hired a U.S. 
attorney to file a U.S. application did not have a duty of disclosure (despite his knowledge of 
the equivalent German patent, his direct instructions to file the patent, and his probable 
knowledge of a duty of disclosure) because he did not have “actual involvement in the pros-
ecution process” arising to a substantial level, which would have required such steps as “re-
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because the president of the company had come up with the concept that was 
later patented, hired the inventors to patent and productize it, was involved in 
emails that discussed the content of an equivalent patent the company was filing 
in Europe, and had deliberately withheld information from the USPTO about a 
first sale that the court found he knew would have invalidated the patent.100  In 
fact, the Avid court itself also offered caveats that limited its holding: 
Under the terms of Rule 56, the PTO does not assign a duty of candor to 
persons not associated with a patent application, or to those involved only 
in a ministerial capacity. Such persons would not be in a position to appre-
ciate that their conduct or knowledge might be relevant to the PTO. . . . Our 
holding does not automatically extend the duty of candor to all individuals 
who contact one of the inventors or sign the small entity affidavit. . . . We 
simply hold that the district court may properly consider a variety of fac-
tors, such as an individual’s position within the company, role in develop-
ing or marketing the patented idea, contact with the inventors or prosecu-
tors, and representations to the PTO in deciding whether that individual is 
“substantively involved” within the meaning of § 1.56(c)(3) and thus owes 
a duty of candor to the PTO. 101 
In contrast to the facts in Avid, the Detkin IP Clinic students’ work for PCI is 
far removed from the prosecution of the patent.  They are not employees of PCI 
or the inventor UPstart company, and are not affiliated with the prosecuting law 
firm.  While they may have contact with the inventors, the contact furthers a goal 
distinct from the prosecution of the patent.  Finally, unlike the parties in these 
cases whose actions occur while the patent applications are being filed, the 
Clinic students start their work for the client after the applications are filed with 
the USPTO.  As such, they make no representations to the USPTO, and while 
their research may affect the decisions that PCI makes in the prosecution down-
stream, the Clinic students themselves have no decision making capability over 
either the content of the application or the prosecution decisions. 
Guidance from one commentator recommends that to avoid a charge of ineq-
uitable conduct, counsel should “[s]how, if possible, that any non-attorney, 
agent, or non-inventor who might be argued to have knowledge of materiality of 
undisclosed information was not involved in the application’s content or related 
 
viewing the application, the prosecution history, or the references disclosed to the patent of-
fice” (citing Janssen Pharm. N.V. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 456 F.Supp.2d 644, 675–76 (D.N.J. 
2006))); Volterra Semiconductor Corp. v. Primarion, Inc., 796 F.Supp.2d 1025, 1134-36 
(N.D. Cal. 2011) (finding former president of company and inventor of predecessor technol-
ogy who might have been involved in decision to file application still not “substantially in-
volved in the prosecution of the patent,” even though he had signed the small entity status 
form on the patent application, since he was not involved in the prosecution and not familiar 
with the content of the application). 
100  Avid, 603 F.3d at 976 & n.3. 
101  Id. 
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decisions . . . .”102  This is definitely the case here.  The students do not drive the 
prosecution decisions for PCI, nor do they make decisions about a PCI patent 
application’s content.  Therefore, the Detkin IP Clinic students likely do not 
meet the threshold of being substantively involved in the preparation or prose-
cution of the application, which incurs a duty of disclosure.  They are not under 
an obligation to disclose any potential prior art they might find in the process of 
doing their research.  However, there is still an added question about what hap-
pens if the students do decide to disclose the potentially material information to 
PCI or the UPstart company.  Would PCI or the UPstart company employees 
then have a duty to disclose? 
2) Obligation of Disclosure for PCI, UPstart, and Their Employees 
The Detkin IP Clinic students might want to include information about possi-
ble prior art in their reports for PCI and the UPstart company for a variety of 
reasons unrelated to the prosecution of the patent.  For example, the students 
might want to show that a certain market is very crowded with patents, or they 
may want to discuss whether or not the product contemplated by the UPstart 
company has freedom to operate.  It is possible that PCI and UPstart will appre-
ciate knowing about the prior art and will disclose all material information to the 
USPTO.  Yet there may also be times that PCI and UPstart may not want to 
search for prior art and may not want to risk having to disclose information to 
the USPTO.  In such a situation, if the students include information in their re-
port that is material to the patentability of the invention, do they force PCI or the 
UPstart company to have such a duty to disclose? 
Possibly, depending on who at PCI and the UPstart company reviews the re-
port.  Assuming for purposes of discussion that the information is in fact mate-
rial, the analysis turns again on whether the recipient is one or more of either an 
“inventor named in the application,” the “attorney or agent who prepares or pros-
ecutes the application,” or a “person who is substantively involved in the prep-
aration or prosecution of the application and who is associated with the inventor, 
the applicant, an assignee, or anyone to whom there is an obligation to assign 
the invention.”103  Because the duty is assigned to a person, and not to a com-
pany, whether a duty attaches will depend on who within PCI and the UPstart 
company is privy to the information.104 
 
102  See Timothy G. Ackermann, Lessons from the Federal Circuit: Defending Against 
Inequitable Conduct Claims, 38 AIPLA Q. J. 259, 291 (2010) (discussing how to avoid a 
ruling of inequitable conduct due to an alleged disclosure violation of a noninventor or nonas-
signee under 37 C.F.R. §1.56).   
103  37 C.F.R. § 1.56(c) (2015).   
104  Sam S. Han, Association of Molecular Pathology Meets Therasense: Analyzing the 
Unenforceability of Isolated-Sequence-Related Patents for UPenn, Columbia, NYU, Yale, and 
Emory, 17 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 31 (2012) (“According to the Manual of Patent Examining 
Procedures (MPEP), this duty is imposed on individuals, not entities or corporations.” (citing 
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Some employees of both PCI and the UPstart company would undoubtedly 
fall into one of the categories, triggering a duty to disclose.  A principal of the 
UPstart company is usually also the inventor of the underlying technology.  Fur-
ther, although PCI does not prosecute Penn’s patents in house (thus removing 
PCI employees somewhat more from the process than employees at other uni-
versity TTOs), some PCI employees do still make decisions about which tech-
nology to patent, and make final decisions about the active applications, includ-
ing strategy about responding to office actions.  This would likely constitute 
doing work related to the “content of the application or decisions related 
thereto,”105 and thus qualify those employees with such responsibilities as to be 
“substantively involved in the preparation or prosecution of the application.”106  
If the Clinic students were to deliver their report to any of these parties, that 
would likely trigger a duty to disclose any information that was in fact material 
to patentability. 
It may be a different result, however, if the Detkin IP Clinic report were to be 
delivered to a non-inventor at the UPstart company, or to a PCI employee who 
did not make decisions about “the content of the application or decisions related 
thereto.”  Assuming for argument’s sake that such persons existed, and that the 
report would still be helpful to them, would sharing the report with them none-
theless trigger a duty of disclosure among the parties closer to the prosecution?  
In other words, when one individual in a company has material information but 
no duty to disclose, and another individual in the same company has a duty to 
disclose but no knowledge of material information, could the knowledge be im-
puted from person to person?  Furthermore, just because one person has 
knowledge in a company, does that subject the whole company to an allegation 
of inequitable conduct if the duty to disclose is not satisfied? 
A few cases and some commentary have implied that it is in fact possible to 
impute knowledge of material information across an entity for purposes of show-
ing inequitable conduct.107  For example, in W.R. Grace & Co. v. Western U.S. 
 
MPEP § 2001.01 (8th ed., rev. 2, May 2004))). 
105  Avid, 603 F.3d at 974. 
106  See Han, supra note 104, at 31 (Discussing Penn’s technology transfer office: “Thus, 
in the context of academic institutions and their respective technology transfer offices (TTO), 
this duty under Rule 56 would fall on the individuals within the TTO who are involved with 
the content or decision-making related to a patent application. This is because the individuals 
within the TTO coordinate the patent application process, relying on the inventors’ participa-
tion and their respective patent attorneys. As described, the relationship created between in-
ventor and the TTO makes it such that the individuals within these offices are “substantively 
involved in the preparation or prosecution of the [patent] application.” (citing 37 C.F.R. § 
1.56)); id. at 57-58 (“In the context of this Article, those that are substantively involved in 
prosecution are the relevant technology licensing officers at the technology transfer offices.”). 
107  See David Hricik, The Risks and Responsibilities of Attorneys and Firms Prosecuting 
Patents for Different Clients in Related Technologies, 8 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 331, 349 & 
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Industries, Inc., the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that a patent was 
deemed unenforceable when the information given to the USPTO by one agent 
of a company was at odds with more correct information potentially held by a 
different agent of a company.108  Grace’s patent issued based on information 
stated in a division President’s affidavit, which turned out to be false.  Even 
though the President had misunderstood facts, and had not knowingly deceived 
the USPTO, the Ninth Circuit argued that on agency principals, since another 
agent of Grace must have known the correct information, Grace as the company 
knew the correct information, and therefore was liable for the false statement.109  
At least one commentator agrees with this outcome, positing that we should hold 
corporations—not just the individuals within them—accountable to the duty of 
disclosure.110  He claims that such a scenario would lead to more valid patents, 
since it would destroy a current incentive for corporations to intentionally com-
partmentalize information in order to ensure that no individual with a duty to 
disclose also has knowledge that is material to patentability.111 
But whether or not this is a wise outcome, imputing knowledge across an en-
tity for duty of disclosure purposes is not uniformly accepted by the courts.112  
Furthermore, such an outcome specifically runs counter to the intent of the 
USPTO, which unambiguously states in its Manual of Patent Examining Proce-
dure (“MPEP”)113 that the duty of disclosure belongs to an individual, rather 
 
n. 68-69 (2000) (listing and describing the circumstances of several cases and one commen-
tary in notes 68 and 69).   
108  W.R. Grace & Co. v. Western U.S. Industries, Inc., 608 F.2d 1214, 1219 (9th Cir. 
1979). 
109  Id.  
110  Lund, supra note 92, at 592. 
111  Id. at 596-99.   
112  See, e.g., Schreiber Foods, Inc. v. Beatrice Cheese, Inc., 31 Fed. Appx. 727, 729 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002) (holding no inequitable conduct because executives of plaintiff company with pos-
sible material information were not substantively involved in the preparation or prosecution 
of the application and did not share information with group that was); Nordberg, Inc. v. 
Telsmith, Inc., 82 F.3d 394, 396-97 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (no inequitable conduct when citation 
was in assignee company’s files, but no showing that individual employees associated with 
prosecution of the patent had actual knowledge during the prosecution); Hricik, supra note 
107, at 350 (“Despite the holding of W.R. Grace, imputing knowledge to find inequitable 
conduct is inappropriate, which other courts have recognized.
 
Information known by one at-
torney in a firm should not be imputed to the client of another attorney in the same firm.” 
(citations omitted)).  This imputation analysis assumes, however, that the party with the duty 
to disclose does not know about the existence and importance of the damaging citation, such 
that continuing not to inquire about the citation would be an effort to “cultivate ignorance,” 
as discussed at length in Hricik. Id. at 352-53. 
113  The MPEP is the set of rules published by the USPTO that guides the practice of patent 
examiners and applicants and their lawyers or agents prosecuting patents through the USPTO.  
The MPEP is based on Title 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations. See U.S. PATENT AND 
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than the individual’s entity.114 Since the USPTO’s own rules about patent pro-
cedure specifically state that the duty of disclosure only applies to the individu-
als that fall within the categories listed in 1.56(c), and not their entities, it would 
be antithetical to hold an entity responsible for inequitable conduct for failing to 
comply with a duty to disclose that did not apply.115 
In summary, given our “worse-case scenario” facts where the Detkin IP Clinic 
students uncovered new information that might be later considered to be material 
to the patentability of a live application, the students could probably still include 
that information in a PCI report without worrying that nondisclosure of the in-
formation might subject the patent to an allegation of inequitable conduct.  How-
ever, this conclusion is not without several cautions.  The students should inter-
face only with individuals that do not have a duty of disclosure.  Individuals with 
a duty of disclosure should be shielded from access to or probably even knowing 
about any report with potentially material information, so that they do not face 
an argument that they “cultivated ignorance” about any citations.116  There is 
likely no imputation across the company, given that the MPEP is clear that a 
duty of disclosure belongs only to the individual.  However, the MPEP does not 
have the force of law,117 and there is currently a split in the courts.118  Given all 
the cautions, we are wise to proceed carefully, even though an allegation of in-
equitable conduct requires clear and convincing proof.  The implication for the 
Clinic student projects are discussed below. 
 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, Introduction to MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE 2 (9th ed. 
2015), https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep-0020-introduction.pdf.  
114  MPEP § 2001.01 (9th ed., Rev. 7, Nov. 2015) (Interpreting 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (c) by 
stating: “The word ‘with’ appears before ‘the assignee’ and ‘anyone to whom there is an ob-
ligation to assign’ to make clear that the duty applies only to individuals, not to organizations. 
For instance, the duty of disclosure would not apply to a corporation or institution as such. 
However, it would apply to individuals within the corporation or institution who were sub-
stantively involved in the preparation or prosecution of the application, and actions by such 
individuals may affect the rights of the corporation or institution.”)   
115  See Hricik, supra note 107, at 350 (“[T]he PTO rules demonstrate that imputation is 
not appropriate to determine compliance with Rule 1.56, which strongly indicates that ineq-
uitable conduct should not be based on imputed knowledge.”).  
116  Id. at 352-53.   
117  Id. at 351 (“Unfortunately, the M.P.E.P.’s clarity is not the final answer and as noted 
above, the case law is in disarray. Although the M.P.E.P. ‘is well known to those registered 
to practice in the PTO and reflects the presumptions under which the PTO operates,’ the 
M.P.E.P. ‘does not have the force of law.’” (quoting Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vas-
cular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 1997))).   
118  Id. (“In light of the conflicting cases, one commentator concludes that it ‘is unclear 
whether . . . this knowledge is imputed to the attorney’s entire firm.’” (quoting Alan H. Mac-
Pherson et al., Ethics in Patent Practice (A Brief Visit to Several Areas of Concern), 574 
PLI/Pat 657, 665 (Oct. 7, 1999))).  
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3) Implications for Student Projects 
Although we have a good argument that uncovering even material infor-
mation while doing non-prosecution patent work for PCI would not subject ei-
ther the students or most PCI employees (and PCI itself) to a duty of disclosure, 
we surely do not want to leave any active PCI patents vulnerable to a claim of 
inequitable conduct.  This leaves the Clinic with three options. 
First, if the Clinic students uncover any information possibly material to pa-
tentability while doing the PCI work, they could keep that information out of the 
final report and within the Clinic and never reveal it to PCI or the UPstart com-
pany.  However, this might be impractical; some of the information uncovered 
could be valuable to the clients for a variety of legal as well as business reasons, 
and a blanket policy never to reveal it would not serve the long-term interests of 
either PCI or the UPstart company.  In addition, although extremely unlikely, 
we cannot discount the small chance that a court might someday impute the 
Detkin IP Clinic students’ knowledge over to the prosecuting attorney or to the 
PCI or UPstart client anyway, regardless of whether the Clinic students revealed 
the information themselves to anyone with an affirmative duty to disclose.  On 
balance, once the Clinic students obtain material information, provided it is oth-
erwise helpful information for PCI or the UPstart company, the Clinic students 
should not keep the information out of their report based solely on a fear of trig-
gering a duty of disclosure. 
A second alternative would be to take on only projects for PCI and UPstart 
companies for which the technology is already patented, such that the duty to 
disclose no longer applies.  Although this alternative too would be possible, it is 
not entirely practical, since many of the PCI/UPstart projects with the most 
pressing commercialization questions have at least one pending patent.  This 
could greatly limit the usefulness of student projects to PCI. 
The third and likely best alternative is to set a procedure in place ahead of 
time between all parties to evaluate and deal consistently with delivery of the 
research reports.  As a preliminary step, all Detkin IP Clinic students should 
study and know the boundaries of the 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 duty of disclosure.  Then 
should the Clinic students later learn about active PCI patent applications while 
doing client work, the students should bring any information they uncover that 
might bear on whether or not those patents should issue to the attention of the 
Clinic supervisor.  If the Clinic supervisor and the Clinic students determine that 
the information is in fact likely material to patentability, they will next determine 
if the information should be revealed to PCI/UPstart.  Assuming that it is other-
wise helpful information, the Clinic students can describe the information in 
general terms, as well as discuss the C.F.R. § 1.56 duty to disclose, with an em-
ployee of PCI or UPstart that is not an inventor and was not substantially in-
volved in the preparation or prosecution of the application.  At that point, the 
PCI and UPStart employees can determine to whom the information should be 
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revealed, if anyone.  If the PCI/UPstart company personnel to whom the infor-
mation is revealed are under the duty of disclosure, and if the information is in 
fact material, PCI and UPstart can then discharge their duty to disclose the in-
formation to the USPTO. 
By setting forth a procedure to handle the sensitive information carefully, the 
Clinic can preserve PCI and UPstart’s options.  PCI and UPstart would likely 
want to disclose any uncovered material citations to the USPTO, not only be-
cause of the obligations set forth under the USPTO Rules, but also to ensure that 
the patent that issues is strong and irrefutable.  However, the Clinic wants to 
make sure that the clients are not forced to disclose any information they did not 
expect to disclose.  By being deliberate about information sharing and being 
thoughtful about the requirements of the USPTO Rules, the Clinic can help to 
meet client needs in a way that is both fruitful and ethical. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Establishing an ongoing relationship between a law school transactional clinic 
and the university technology transfer office can provide a unique learning op-
portunity for students and a valuable resource for the university and its nascent 
start-up companies.  Students gain sophisticated and interesting practical expe-
rience at the crossroads between law and business, and the university and its spin 
offs gain critical (and cost-efficient) patent-informed commercialization re-
search.  There can be unique challenges to such an arrangement, including ethi-
cal challenges, that may seem daunting at first to navigate.  However, the chal-
lenges are surmountable through careful consideration and cooperative effort, 
making the payoff gain well worth the effort. 
  
THIS VERSION MAY CONTAIN INACCURATE OR INCOMPLETE PAGE 
NUMBERS. PLEASE CONSULT THE PRINT OR ONLINE DATABASE 
VERSIONS FOR THE PROPER CITATION INFORMATION. 
2017] Ethical Puzzles 41 
 
Form 1 
DRAFT MODEL ENGAGEMENT LETTER 
[DATE] 
VIA EMAIL AND 
FIRST CLASS U.S. MAIL 
 
[CLIENT NAME AND ADDRESS] 
 
 Re: Engagement for Services – ___ Semester 201_ 
 
Dear [CLIENT]: 
 
We are pleased to inform you that the ______  Legal Clinic (“the Clinic”) is 
prepared to provide [CLIENT NAME] with legal assistance for this semester.  
This letter outlines the scope and terms of the Clinic’s representation.  If the 
terms as outlined below are acceptable to you, please sign the enclosed copy 
of this letter and return it to us at the Clinic address listed above.  Please 
understand that if you do not promptly return an executed copy of this letter, it 
may greatly limit and possibly preclude the ability of the Clinic to provide legal 
services to you. 
 
Scope of Representation: 
 
For the __ semester of 201_, the Clinic agrees to represent [CLIENT] with 
respect to the following matters: 
 
 [FILL IN DESCRIPTION OF SCOPE OF WORK] 
 
At this time, the Clinic’s representation will not include legal work beyond 
the work described above.  However, if [CLIENT] and the Clinic agree, the 
Clinic may provide additional services to [CLIENT] by the parties either amend-
ing this agreement or entering into a separate written agreement in the future. 
 
General Terms: 
 
You are aware that the legal assistance provided to you will be performed by 
student counselors under the supervision of a faculty advisor who is a member 
of the ___ Bar.  You acknowledge that the Clinic is an educational program that 
provides both a community service and a valuable educational experience for 
law students, and you consent to assistance by law students.  While the legal 
services the Clinic provides are free, you agree that [CLIENT] will pay for any 
and all USPTO application and filing fees as applicable. 
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The Clinic will represent [CLIENT] only and not you or any of [CLIENT’S] 
employees or agents in an individual capacity.  Although we will be working 
with various [CLIENT] employees in order to deliver our services, each of these 
employees will act as [CLIENT’S] agent with respect to its dealings with the 
Clinic in order to best serve the interests of [CLIENT]. 
 
At times, it may be helpful for the Clinic to consult with other attorneys or 
other professionals that are part of our Clinic regarding the legal questions raised 
by your matters. You hereby authorize the Clinic to discuss with other attorneys 
or professionals that are part of our Clinic [CLIENT’S] legal matters in accord-
ance with its ethical and professional duties. Such an authorization is understood 
by both parties not to constitute a waiver of the attorney-client privilege or a 
breach of our confidentiality obligations to you. 
 
The attorney-client privilege applies to all legal matters that we handle for 
you.  However, certain business matters or documents may fall outside of the 
attorney-client privilege.  Nonetheless, during our representation, we will en-
deavor to safeguard your important business documents and information, 
whether or not the privilege applies.  You understand that you may also purpose-
fully or inadvertently waive the attorney-client privilege by discussing privi-
leged information with third parties not affiliated with the Clinic, and you must 
therefore take care to safeguard such information.  You should particularly be 
mindful of potential disclosure that could occur when third parties have access 
to the email account that you use when communicating with the Clinic, as with 
an employer-owned account, an account open to third party access, or an account 
that you share with other users.  Please feel free to discuss issues of confidenti-
ality and attorney-client privilege with us at any time. 
 
From time to time, the Clinic features its clients in publicity materials or in 
representations in the media solely to promote our clients and the work that we 
do in the Clinic.  You acknowledge and agree that the Clinic may, subject to its 
ethical and professional responsibilities and without obtaining any further in-
formed consent, refer to its representation of [CLIENT] and the work performed 
for [CLIENT], and use [CLIENT’S] name, related trademarks, and logos for 
public relations purposes, including without limitation, on the Clinic’s website 
and in social media, even after the Clinic’s relationship with [CLIENT] has ter-
minated. 
 
Your diligent and responsible cooperation and support is necessary.  Subject 
to our ethical and professional responsibilities, the Clinic reserves the right to 
terminate this relationship if we feel that we are unable to adequately service 
you.  If the Clinic determines that it must terminate the attorney-client relation-
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ship under these terms, the Clinic will send advance written notice of such ter-
mination to [CLIENT’S] address.  [CLIENT] has the right to terminate this re-
lationship at any time and for any reason by delivering written notice to the 
Clinic at the address above. 
 
Please keep a copy of this letter for your records.  If you have any questions 
or concerns about this letter, please contact us at (215) 898-8044 or via email at 
_______ or _______.  We look forward to working together. 
  
  Sincerely, 
  __________________ 
    [NAME] 
 
Law Student Counselor 
  
  __________________ 
    [NAME] 
Law Student Counselor 
 
Supervised by: [SUPERVISOR NAME] 
 
Agreed and accepted this__ __ day of _____, 201_ 
 
[CLIENT] 
 
By:_________________________________________ 
 Name: 
 Title: 
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Form 2 
Draft Model Consulting and Confidentiality Agreement 
 
This Consulting Agreement (“Agreement”) is entered into this ______ day of 
___________, _____ (“Effective Date”) by and between the ______ Legal 
Clinic (hereinafter referred to as “the Clinic”) and ______ (hereinafter referred 
to as “Consultant”).  The parties agree as follows: 
1. Scope: Consultant shall act as an agent of the Clinic in order to receive infor-
mation and provide advice (“Advice”) necessary to assist the Clinic in rendering 
legal services to Clinic client _______ (“Client”).  Consultant shall not be nor 
act as an agent of the Clinic for any other purpose. 
 
2. Payment: The Clinic and the Consultant agree that the Advice provided by 
the Consultant shall be offered free of charge. 
 
3. Use of Counsel: The Clinic will use Consultant’s Advice for the limited pur-
pose of providing legal counsel to Client, and for no other purpose.  All Advice 
shall be deemed Confidential Information and shall be attorney client privileged. 
 
4. Confidentiality: 
 
4.1 Definition of Confidential Information: “Confidential Information” as 
used in this Agreement shall mean any and all technical or non-technical infor-
mation related to the Client and legal analysis related to the same, including but 
not limited to inventions, patentable subject matter, patent applications, freedom 
to operate or patentability assessments, copyrights, trade secrets, computer files, 
and Client information related to past, current, or proposed business plans. 
 
4.2 Nondisclosure and Nonuse Obligations: Consultant shall protect the con-
fidentiality of all Confidential Information and, except as permitted in this 
Agreement, Consultant may not use nor disclose the Confidential Information. 
Consultant may use the Confidential Information solely to assist the Clinic in 
rendering legal services to Client under this Agreement. 
 
4.3 Exclusion from Nondisclosure and Nonuse Obligations: Consultant’s ob-
ligations under Section 4.2 (“Nondisclosure and Nonuse Obligations”) shall not 
apply to any such portion of the Confidential Information that the Consultant 
can demonstrate was in the public domain. A disclosure of Confidential Infor-
mation by Consultant, either (i) in response to a valid order by a court or other 
governmental body, (ii) otherwise required by law, or (iii) necessary to establish 
the rights of either party under this Agreement, shall not be considered a breach 
of this Agreement or a waiver of confidentiality for other purposes, provided, 
however, that Consultant shall provide prompt written notice thereof to the 
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Clinic such that the Clinic may further advise the Client about protecting the 
Client’s rights. 
5. Survival and Termination: 
 
5.1 Expiration: This term of this Agreement shall be through _______. 
 
5.2 Survival: The terms and obligations of Sections 4 of the Agreement shall 
survive and remain in full force and effect after expiration or any termination of 
this Agreement, regardless of the cause of such termination. 
 
6. Applicable Law: This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the state 
of _________. 
 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement and agreed 
to be bound by its terms. 
 
 
_________________ Legal Clinic 
 
Represented by:_________________________________________ 
Name: 
Title: 
 
Consultant 
 
By:_________________________________________ 
Name: 
 
 
